模态可靠论能够跨越“必然性之桥”吗?  

Can Modal Reliabilism Theory Cross the Bridge of Necessity?

作　　者：孙蕾 SUN Lei(School of Humanities,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]同济大学人文学院,上海200092

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2023年第12期35-41,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：乔治·毕勒称之为证据/概念论证的先验论证策略包括两个层面:直观作为知识基本证据来源有效,当且仅当模态可靠论成立。模态可靠主义理论给出了“直观作为知识基本证据来源”这一先验判断的具体说明。借由此模态认识论机制层面的说明,可以反驳斯特劳德针对先验论证中先验主张之合理性的怀疑论立场,即是“必然性之桥”问题。此外,必然性之桥问题可被看作融合难题的怀疑论版本。基于以下三方面论述:其一,“必然性之桥”本身的合理性问题;其二,模态可靠论的反怀疑论倾向;其三,必然性之桥作为融合难题的怀疑论版本,最终作出结论:模态可靠论能够跨越“必然性之桥”。The transcendental argument strategy,which is called evidence/concept argument by George Bealer,includes two aspects:intuition as a source of basic evidence for knowledge is legitimate,if and only if modal reliabilism theory holds.The theory of modal reliabilism gives a specific explanation of the a priori judgment that“intuition functions as the source of basic evidence for knowledge”.Through explanation of the mechanism of modal epistemology,Stroud’s skepticism about transcendental argument,namely the“bridge of necessity”problem,can be refuted.Moreover,the bridge of necessity problem can be seen as a skepticism version of the integration problem.Therefore,based on the following aspects:First,the validity of the“bridge of necessity”problem;Second,the anti-skeptical effect of Modal Reliabilism;And third,bridge of necessity problem as a skepticism version of the integration problem,MR theory can finally cross the“bridge of necessity”.

关 键 词：模态可靠论 先验论证 “必然性之桥” 融合难题 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]