绿蓝悖论:证据效力消失的界限?  

The Grue Paradox:Where Does the Power of Evidence Disappear?

作　　者：梁贤华 LIANG Xianhua(School of Philosophy and Social Development,South China Normal University,Guangzhou,Guangdong,510631)

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学哲学与社会发展学院,广东广州510631

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2024年第3期50-57,共8页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：诺顿近年来系统地发展了一种新确证理论,反对将归纳推理形式化,并且认为诸如简单性这样的理论评价标准也不是普遍有效的;相反,一切归纳推理都是局部性的,并且归纳推理只能通过局部有效的事实性证据得到辩护。以实质归纳理论为基础,诺顿给出了两个解决绿蓝悖论的方案。在他的第一个解决方案中,他认为可以从经验证据的角度打破绿蓝悖论的困境;但是在他的第二个方案中,他认为在想象的时空膨胀情况下,没有任何经验证据能够对相互矛盾的假说进行区分。绿蓝悖论成为经验证据效力消失的边界。但是,在诺顿的实质归纳理论中,实际上也需要预设某种普遍性的条件。Norton has systematically developed a new confirmation theory in recent years,opposing the formalization of inductive reasoning and arguing that theoretical evaluation criteria such as simplicity are not universally valid;on the contrary,all inductive reasoning is local,and they can only be justified by factual evidence locally valid.Based on his material theory of induction,Norton offers two solutions to the grue paradox.In his first solution,he argues that the dilemma of the grue paradox can be broken by empirical evidence;however,in his second solution,he argues that in the case of imaginary space-time expansion,no empirical evidence can distinguish between two contradictory hypotheses.Hence the grue paradox becomes the boundary on which the validity of empirical evidence disappears.But in Norton's material theory of induction,it is actually necessary to presuppose some kind of universal conditions.

关 键 词：绿蓝悖论 证据 实质归纳理论 自然种类 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学] O144.2[理学—数学]