企业精准扶贫与融资约束  

Enterprise Precision Poverty Alleviation and Financing Constraints

作　　者：李坤[1] 娄阳 LI Kun;LOU Yang(Finance Department of Jiangsu Vocational and Technical College of Finance and Economics;Business School of Huaiyin Normal University,Huai'an 223003,Jiangsu)

机构地区：[1]江苏财经职业技术学院财务处 [2]淮阴师范学院商学院,江苏淮安223003

出　　处：《江苏商论》2024年第4期69-71,80,共4页Jiangsu Commercial Forum

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究项目:大数据背景下管理会计人才培养研究(2021SJA1852)。

摘　　要：由于存在代理和信息不对称等问题,目前并不存在真正完美的资本市场。银行作为企业的信贷融资主体,对信贷风险的控制程度很高,企业在进行信贷融资时会面临很多限制。随着企业发展过程中对资金需求的增加,融资约束逐渐显现并成为制约企业发展成长的一个重要因素。企业在追求自身发展的同时也需要实现社会价值,通过参与精准扶贫,助力乡村振兴战略,能够为企业树立良好形象,降低信息的不对称影响,改善经营状况。本文从精准扶贫的视角,依据信息不对称理论、信号传递理论和委托代理理论,对此进行分析并实证检验。Due to issues such as agency and information asymmetry,there is currently no truly perfect capital market.As the main body of credit financing for enterprises,banks have a high degree of control over credit risks,and enterprises will face many restrictions when conducting credit financing.With the increasing demand for funds during the development process of enterprises,financing constraints have gradually emerged and become an important factor restricting the development and growth of enterprises.While pursuing their own development,enterprises also need to realize social value.By participating in targeted poverty alleviation and promoting rural revitalization strategies,they can establish a good image for enterprises,reduce the impact of information asymmetry,and improve their business operations.This article analyzes and empirically tests this from the perspective of precision poverty alleviation,based on information asymmetry theory,signal transmission theory,and principal-agent theory.

关 键 词：精准扶贫 企业社会责任 融资约束 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]