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作 者:沈波[1] 焦倩 孙祥 SHEN Bo;JIAO Qian;SUN Xiang(Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China;Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China;CEDR and IAS,Economics and Management School,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)
机构地区:[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]中山大学岭南学院,广州510275 [3]武汉大学经济发展研究中心、高级研究中心、经济与管理学院,武汉430072
出 处:《系统工程理论与实践》2024年第1期29-51,共23页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基 金:教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(22YJC790102);国家优秀青年科学基金(72122017);霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金(171076);中央高校基本科研业务费(2042023kf0137)。
摘 要:本文通过考虑平台企业之间和卖家之间的不完全竞争,研究非对称平台企业实施“二选一”行为的动机,并系统分析其对市场竞争、消费者和福利的影响.研究发现,只有当平台之间差异化足够小以及卖家之间同质性较强时,具有市场优势地位的平台企业才能通过与卖家签订“二选一”形式的排他性合约从而排除其竞争对手.此时,“二选一”行为将通过提高平台制订的佣金水平,进而提高卖家商品的价格,并最终降低消费者剩余以及社会总福利.因此,禁止平台实施“二选一”可以提高消费者剩余以及总福利水平,尽管未必增加卖家与竞争平台的利润.这说明禁止平台使用“二选一”等排他性交易的初衷不应是保护卖家或者小型竞争性平台,而是维护消费者权益以及保障平台市场的效率.本文的结论为平台“二选一”的反竞争效应的判定提供了理论支持,同时为平台经济领域中此类行为的规制提供了实践指导.反垄断实践中是否应当将优势平台“二选一”行为判定为其滥用市场支配地位,除了重点关注平台的差异化程度以及卖家之间的竞争程度外,还需要综合考虑平台内卖家的数量、平台“二选一”合约的形式以及平台披露的合约信息等因素.By considering the imperfect competition among platforms and sellers,this paper investigates the incentives behind the“pick one of two”exclusive dealing used by asymmetric platforms,as well as potential effects on market competition,consumers,and welfare.The study finds that only when the platform differentiation is sufficiently small and the homogeneity among sellers is strong,can dominant platform exclude its competitor by signing exclusive contracts with sellers in the form of“pick one of two.”At this time,the“pick one of two”behavior will increase the commission level set by the platform,raise the price of seller’s products,and ultimately reduce consumer surplus and social welfare.Therefore,prohibiting platforms from implementing“pick one of two”may not necessarily increase the profits of sellers and competing platforms,but it can increase consumer surplus and welfare.This suggests that the purpose of prohibiting the use of exclusive dealing such as“pick one of two”by platforms should not be to protect sellers or small competitive platforms,but to maintain consumer interest and guarantee the efficiency of platform markets.The paper clarifies some of the controversies in practice,provides theoretical support for the judgment of the anti-competitive effects of platform“pick one of two,”and provides practical guidance for regulating such behaviors in the platform economy.To determine whether the dominant platform’s“pick one of two”behavior should be considered as an abuse of market dominance,it is necessary to comprehensively consider factors such as the number of sellers within the platform,the contract forms provided by the platforms,and the contract information disclosed by the platform,in addition to focusing on the degree of differentiation between platforms and the degree of competition among sellers within the platform.
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