弗雷格-吉奇问题与实践推理  

Frege-Geach Problem and Practical Reasoning

作　　者：焦雯雯 Wenwen Jiao(Department of Philosophy,Sun Yat-sen University)

机构地区：[1]中山大学哲学系

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2024年第1期98-116,共19页Studies in Logic

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“逻辑的规范性与形式性研究”(21BZX103)。

摘　　要：对道德判断的条件句推理的非认知主义解释面临弗雷格-吉奇问题的挑战。我们考察了经典的表达主义者提出的解决方案。共同基本策略是把非断定语境中的规范性陈述,转化成断定语境中的非规范性陈述,从而给出统一处理信念和态度/欲求的语义学。相比起来,近年兴起的混合表达主义,主张规范性语句是信念成分和表达成分的混合,是更有希望的解决方案。论文比较了道德假言推理、法律规范推理以及实践推理之间的差异,试图通过对信念和欲求、意图之间的关系的说明,对规范性语句的不同推理类型给出统一的解释。Non-cognitivist explanations of conditional sentence reasoning about moral judgements face the challenge of the Frege-Geach problem.We examine classical solutions proposed by expressivists.The common basic strategy is to take normative statements in non-assertive contexts and transform them into non-normative statements in assertive contexts,thus giving a semantics that treats beliefs and attitudes/desires in a unified way.However,can attitudinal inconsistency be ultimately reduced to logical inconsistency by interpreting attitude statements with the help of belief statements?The problem of negation and the problem of disagreement continue to plague expressivists.The hybrid expressivism project,which attempts to combine beliefs and non-cognitive attitudes and to reduce the validity of reasoning to the logical connection of beliefs,actually leaves the expressivist position.Based on Gregory's theory of"desires as beliefs",we attempt to give a similar but different account of the hybrid inconsistency problem in practical reasoning to hybrid expressivism.The paper compares the differences between moral hypothetical reasoning,legal normative reasoning,and practical reasoning,and attempts to give a unified interpretation of the different types of reasoning about normative statements by giving an account ofthe relationship between beliefs and desires and intentions.

关 键 词：弗雷格-吉奇问题 约根森难题 实践推理 规范性信念 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]