唯物史观正义观念试探:历史的冷漠与主体的道德  

On the Indifference of History and the Morality of the Subject

作　　者：王冠迪 WANG Guan-di(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Jilin University,Changchun 130012)

机构地区：[1]吉林大学哲学社会学院,吉林长春130012

出　　处：《阴山学刊》2024年第2期68-72,95,共6页Yinshan Academic Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“构建当代中国马克思主义哲学学术体系研究”(19ZDA017)。

摘　　要：塔克-伍德命题是关于唯物史观是否具有正义观念,具有怎样的正义观念的问题。对于“马克思对资本主义的批判是否基于道德”这一问题产生分歧的两方,往往忽视了道德的主语是现实的人。如果把历史作为主语,把规律层面的正常解读为伦理方面的正义,就会将历史运动的主体性完全抽离,将实然解读为应然;如果单纯强调以人为主语的道德,将其扩展到历史运动规律的论述中去,又会使唯物史观降格为传统的道德学说,破坏其历史研究的科学性。正确把握唯物史观中决定性和可选择性的张力,是避免这两种倾向的关键。The series of questions represented by the Tuck-Wood proposition are whether the materialist view of history has a concept of justice and what kind of concept of justice it has.The two sides who have disagreements on whether Marx’s criticism of capitalism is based on morality often overlook that the subject of morality should be the real person.If history is taken as the subject and“normal”at the level of laws is interpreted as“justice”in terms of ethics,the subjectivity of historical movements will be completely detached,and the reality will be interpreted as the should be;If we simply emphasize the morality of using human subjects and extend it to the discourse on the laws of historical movement,it will downgrade historical materialism to traditional moral theory and undermine the scientificity of its historical research.Correctly grasping the decisive and selective tension in the materialist view of history is the key to avoiding these two tendencies.

关 键 词：马克思 塔克-伍德命题 唯物史观 道德 正义 

分 类 号：B03[哲学宗教—哲学理论] B82-0