土地财政如何影响中国企业出口?  

How Does Land Finance Affect Chinese Firm Export?

作　　者：邵朝对[1] 苏丹妮[1] SHAO Chaodui;SU Danni(School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)

机构地区：[1]南开大学经济学院,天津300071

出　　处：《浙江工商大学学报》2024年第1期122-137,共16页Journal of Zhejiang Gongshang University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“劳动者异质性与中国价值链双循环的获益规模及分配:一般均衡与量化分析”(72273069);国家自然科学基金面上项目“美国推动供应链重塑对中国经济的影响及对策研究”(72373076)。

摘　　要：文章从分税制改革后地方政府财政激励模式转变的视角,首次考察了充当辖区间竞争“新”工具的土地财政对企业出口的影响。研究发现:土地财政通过引发地方政府的支出竞争、税收竞争和补贴竞争不仅提高了企业出口概率和出口强度,还抑制了企业出口退出和延长了出口持续期。但由于存在与税收竞争、补贴竞争相关的企业寻租、“政治包袱”以及与支出竞争相关的公共品偏向性扭曲配置,土地财政也使出口企业长期被锁定于低质量、低附加值和低技术复杂度的低端竞争方式。概括而言,地方政府过度依赖土地财政开展辖区间竞争的策略性行为在促成出口繁荣的同时也付出了出口企业核心竞争力丧失的代价,对中国“大而不强”出口模式产生了“土地财政诅咒”。This paper probes into the impact of land finance as a“new”tool for inter-jurisdictional competition on firmsexport from the perspective of the transformation of local governmentsfiscal incentive mode after tax distribution reform for the first time.The results show that:land finance not only increases firmsexport probability and intensity but also inhibits firmsexit and prolongs firmsexport duration through stimulating local governmentsexpenditure competition,tax competition and subsidy competition.However,the existence of rent-seeking,“political burden”related to tax competition and subsidy competition,and biased expenditure structures misallocation related to expenditure competition also locks export firms into low-end competition with low quality,low value-added and low technical complexity.In a word,this paper confirms that the strategic behavior of local governmentsexcessive reliance on land finance to carry out inter-jurisdictional competition not only contributes to export prosperity but also pays the price of losing the core competitiveness of export firms,which creates a“land finance curse”to Chinas“large but not strong”export mode.

关 键 词：土地财政 企业出口 出口模式 策略性竞争 土地财政“诅咒” 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] F752