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作 者:李国昊[1] 梅婷 梁永滔 Li Guohao;Mei Ting;Liang Yongtao(School of Management,Jiangsu University,Zhenjiang 212013,China)
机构地区:[1]江苏大学管理学院
出 处:《江苏大学学报(社会科学版)》2024年第2期100-112,共13页Journal of Jiangsu University(Social Science Edition)
基 金:江苏省社会科学基金一般项目(14GLB008)。
摘 要:“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。The new marketing model of“live show+e-commerce”is developing rapidly,but there are many problems along with the booming.This paper studies how the live commerce platforms and the platform merchants collude to garner excessive profits,builds an evolutionary game model between live commerce platforms and government regulatory agencies based on different reward and punishment mechanisms,analyzes the stability of equilibrium points in the system,and conducts a simulation analysis.The results show:under both the static reward and punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and static punishment mechanism,there is no stable equilibrium point;under both the static reward and dynamic punishment mechanism and the dynamic reward and dynamic punishment mechanism,there is a stable equilibrium point,but under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,there is a lower probability of collusion between the platforms and the merchants.Under the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,the collusion between the platforms and live e-sellers is closely related to the rewards and punishments:when the punishment increases,the probability of collusion between them decreases,and the cost of governmental supervision decreases as well;when the reward increases,the probability of strict governmental supervision decreases,and the probability of collusion between the platforms and the sellers decreases but little.Therefore,the scientific and reasonable dynamic reward and punishment mechanism adopted by the regulators is conducive to the stable development of the live streaming industry.
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