合作金融组织剩余控制权安排:认识澄清与制度重构  被引量:1

Residual Control Arrangements in Cooperative Financial Organizations:Understanding Clarification and Institutional Reconstruction

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作  者:刘西川 杨梦瑶 LIU Xichuan;YANG Mengyao

机构地区:[1]华中农业大学经济管理学院,武汉430070

出  处:《华南师范大学学报(社会科学版)》2024年第1期22-40,205,共20页Journal of South China Normal University:Social Science Edition

基  金:国家社会科学基金项目“脱贫地区乡村振兴金融服务模式多元联结协同创新研究”(22BGL066);华中农业大学高层次人才启动费项目“加快建设中国特色农业金融市场体系研究”(108/11042010017);华中农业大学自主科技创新基金项目“持续推进脱贫地区乡村振兴的金融支持研究”(2662023JGPY001)。

摘  要:中国合作金融组织在剩余控制权制度安排设计的过程中受到了合作社思潮和股份制思潮两种思潮的驱动。前者强调成员主导和民主决策,后者注重风险责任和风控能力。然而,这两种思潮及其相关的民主、集权和分权三种设计思路均未能实现成员间能力、权利、风险及收益的匹配。反思、澄清合作金融组织剩余控制权制度设计中的合作社元素和股份制元素,构建一个“制度规则—制度过程—制度目标”的分析框架,并在该框架下结合具体案例,对分别代表民主思路、集权思路和分权思路的剩余控制权民主决策模式、发起人控制型模式和分权型模式进行分析与比较,有助于解决合作金融组织剩余控制权制度安排中的难题。展望未来,重构合作金融组织的剩余控制权制度安排应将其理解为一个特殊的金融中介,围绕大小股东利益冲突这一核心矛盾,按照风险匹配与能力匹配两个原则配置剩余控制权,以期实现组织成员间能力、权利、风险及收益的匹配。China's cooperative financial organizations are driven by two thoughts of co-operative thought and joint-stock thought in the process of designing residual control system arrangement.The former emphasizes member-led and democratic deci-sion-making,while the latter emphasizes risk responsibility and risk control ability.However,these two thoughts and their related democratic,centralized and decentralized design ideas fail to achieve the matching of capabilities,rights,risks and benefits among members.This paper reflects on and clarifies the cooperative elements and shareholding elements in the design of residual control rights system of cooperative financial organizations,and constructs an analytical framework of“institutional rule-institutional process-institutional goal”.This paper analyzes and compares the democratic decision-making mode of residual control,the initia-tor control mode and the decentralization mode,which represent democratic thinking,centralization thinking and decentralization thinking respectively.Looking forward to the future,the institutional arrangement of residual control rights in cooperative financial organizations should be understood as a special financial intermediary.Focusing on the core contradiction of the conflict of interests of large and small shareholders,the residual control rights should be allocated according to the two principles of risk matching and capability matching,so as to achieve the matching of capabilities,rights,risks and returns among members of the organization.

关 键 词:合作金融组织 剩余控制权 大小股东冲突 风险匹配 能力匹配 

分 类 号:F832.3[经济管理—金融学]

 

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