论波爱修斯的幸福观  

On Boethius’ View of Happiness

作　　者：丰大双 FENG Dashuang(School of Marxism,Tianjin University of Technology,Tianjin 300384,China)

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学马克思主义学院,天津300384

出　　处：《江苏海洋大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2024年第2期50-59,共10页Journal of Jiangsu Ocean University（Humanities & Social Sciences Edition）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(22CKS024)。

摘　　要：古罗马哲学家波爱修斯通过哲学的反思完成了对幸福的追问。在探讨幸福的实质时,他对财富、权力、自由、信仰等关涉个体人生幸福的重要问题进行了理性反思,认为人类探索幸福的过程就是一个从“物我”到“自我”,最终上升到“超我”的精神实践过程。他相信真正的幸福就是一种“至善”,并且这种善无法由外部获得,只能依赖个体的内省。只是波爱修斯对幸福的理解过于保守和固执,导致他太过强调理性之于幸福体认上的决定性作用。但如果能自觉地将波爱修斯对幸福的解构置于理性与情感的双重作用之下,对于当代人勇敢挣脱外物烦扰、发掘幸福人生真相和揭示生命真谛,还是有着一定的启示意义的。The ancient Roman philosopher Boethius completed his inquiry into happiness through philosophical reflection.When exploring the essence of happiness,he conducted a rational reflection on important issues related to individual life happiness such as wealth,power,freedom,and faith.He believes that the process of human exploration of happiness is a spiritual practice process from“material self”to“self”,and ultimately rising to“superego”.He believes that true happiness is a kind of“ultimate goodness”,and this goodness cannot be obtained from the outside and can only rely on individual introspection.However,Boethius’s understanding of happiness is too conservative and stubborn,leading him to overemphasize the decisive role of reason in the perception of happiness.But if people can consciously place Boethius’deconstruction of happiness under the dual effects of reason and emotion,it still has certain enlightening significance for contemporary people to bravely break free from external troubles,discover the truth of happy life,and reveal the true meaning of life.

关 键 词：波爱修斯 幸福观 《哲学的慰藉》 理性 爱智慧 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]