对数字平台自我优待行为批判的批判性分析  

A Critical Analysis of the Criticism against Self-Preferential Treatment by Digital Platforms

作　　者：兰磊[1] Lan Lei

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学知识产权学院

出　　处：《东方法学》2024年第2期122-135,共14页Oriental Law

基　　金：上海市哲学社会科学项目“数字平台封禁行为的反垄断法规制研究”(项目批准号:2022EFX006)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：近年来,数字平台自我优待现象受到广泛关注。人们担心平台企业利用它传导市场势力,破坏平台内部竞争、垄断周边市场,因此对它作出概括性否定评价,主张对平台企业强化规制,设置平等对待义务。然而,自我优待行为具有广泛的促进竞争效果,不但是纵向一体化的必然内含之义,而且是某些有益商业模式的必要成分,以及约束甚至颠覆在位企业的重要机制。相反,以平等对待义务之名概括禁止自我优待,不但与反垄断法的立法目的相悖,还会损害动态竞争,过度夸大平台内竞争的重要性而无视平台间竞争的约束力量。自我优待行为种类繁多,竞争效果差异巨大,不应该概括规制,而应该回归反垄断法的基本范式,对具体自我优待行为作理性的个案分析。In recent years,the phenomenon of self-preferential treatment by digital platforms has received widespread attention.Concerns have been raised that platform companies may exploit it to conduct their market power to undermine internal competition within the platform,monopolize peripheral markets.As a result,they are generally criticized,and people advocate for strengthened regulation of platform companies and the establishment of obligations for equal treatment.However,self-preferential treatment behavior has a wide range of competitive promotion effects.It is not only an inherent aspect of vertical integration but also a necessary component of certain beneficial business models,and a crucial mechanism for constraining or even overturning incumbent companies.Conversely,to prohibit self-preferential treatment under the guise of equal treatment obligations not only contradicts the legislative purpose of antitrust laws but also undermines dynamic competition.It exaggerates the importance of internal platform competition while ignoring the constraining power of inter-platform competition.With various types of self-preferential treatment behaviors and significant differences in competitive effects,they should not be regulated in a blanket manner.Instead,they should return to the basic paradigm of antitrust laws and conduct rational case-by-case analysis of specific self-preferential treatment behaviors.

关 键 词：反垄断法 平台 平台经济 自我优待 差别待遇 传导效应 

分 类 号：DF41[政治法律—经济法学]