财政分权、地方政府创新偏好与区域创新能力  

Fiscal Devolution,Local Government Innovation Preference and Regional Innovation Ability

作　　者：李冬梅[1] 孙佳敏 LI Dong-mei;SUN Jia-min(School of Finance and Public Administration,Anhui University of Finance and Economics,Bengbu Anhui 233030,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学财政与公共管理学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2024年第2期32-39,127,共9页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

基　　金：安徽财经大学研究生示范课程建设项目“公共财政理论与实践”(CXJHSFKC1803);安徽财经大学研究生科研创新基金项目“财政支农助力乡村振兴的效用评价研究”(ACYC2021001)。

摘　　要：本文基于2007-2021年我国30个省份的面板数据,通过建立系统GMM模型实证分析财政分权对区域创新能力的影响。研究表明:财政分权显著促进区域创新能力,以地方政府创新偏好为中介变量,财政分权能通过促进地方政府创新偏好,进而正向影响区域创新能力。分地区考察发现,财政分权对区域创新能力的影响存在地区差异性。在东中部地区,财政分权会显著促进区域创新能力;在西部地区,财政分权与区域创新能力的关系并不显著。This paper analyzes the influence of fiscal devolution on collective innovation power by building a systematic GMM model based on panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2007 to 2021.The basic conclusion is that fiscal power sharing significantly promotes local capacity for innovation,and fiscal power sharing can positively affect local innovation ability by influencing local gov⁃ernment innovation preference as a mediating variable.The examination by region reveals that there is local variability in the impact of fiscal devolution on local innovation ability.In the east-central region,fiscal devolution significantly promotes regional ability to inno⁃vate;in the western region,the relationship between fiscal devolution and regional ability to innovate is not significant.

关 键 词：财政分权 地方政府创新偏好 区域创新能力 系统GMM 

分 类 号：F810.7[经济管理—财政学]