检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:张子鸣 王新平[1] 苏畅 孙林辉[1] ZHANG Ziming;WANG Xinping;SU Chang;SUN Linhui(School of Management,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China;School of Safety Science and Engineering,Xi’an University of Science and Technology,Xi’an 710054,China)
机构地区:[1]西安科技大学管理学院,西安710054 [2]西安科技大学安全科学与工程学院,西安710054
出 处:《系统管理学报》2024年第2期341-355,共15页Journal of Systems & Management
基 金:国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY109);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(22YJAZH104)。
摘 要:考虑决策者成本-收益感知偏差对质量决策的影响,将前景理论和心理账户理论引入共享制造多主体演化博弈过程中,构建不同成本收益摊配机制下共享制造质量协同演化博弈模型,分析各博弈主体动态演化规律。研究结果表明:共享制造质量协同提升是多因素共同作用的结果,不仅受到外部因素的影响,还受决策者自身主观因素的调节;成本收益摊配机制能够有效改变共享制造质量协同演化的稳定状态,其中动态成本收益摊配机制的效力最优;激励机制的引入可以有效弥补成本收益摊配机制的效力空白,促使共享决策系统稳定策略向“帕累托最优”方向演化发展。This paper,considering the impact of decision maker’s cost-benefit perception bias on quality decision,and introducing the prospect theory and mental account theory into the shared manufacturing multi-subject evolutionary game process,builds a shared manufacturing quality synergy game model in different cost-benefit allocation mechanisms,and analyzes the dynamic evolutionary law of each game subject.The results show that the quality synergy improvement of shared manufacturing is the result of multiple factors,which is not only influenced by external factors,but also regulated by the decision maker’s own subjective factors.Cost-benefit allocation mechanisms can effectively change the evolutionary stability of shared manufacturing quality synergy,of which,the dynamic cost-benefit allocation mechanism is the most effective.The introduction of incentive mechanisms can effectively fill the effectiveness gap of the cost-benefit allocation mechanisms and promote the evolution and development of the stable strategy in the shared decision-making system towards“Pareto optimality”.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.49