补贴退坡背景下中国新能源汽车和传统汽车博弈分析  

Game analysis of China's new energy vehicles and traditional vehicles under the backgroundof subsidydecline

作　　者：蔡叶凡 熊慧君 张欣宇 李雯萱 罗王明 Cai Yefan;Xiong Huijun;Zhang Xinyu;Li Wenxuan;Luo Wangming(University of Economics,Wuhan 430000,China)

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院,湖北武汉430000

出　　处：《汽车知识》2024年第2期16-18,共3页Auto Know

基　　金：2022年湖北社科基金后期项目“‘双碳’战略目标下中国新能源汽车创新发展推动绿色崛起的路径与对策研究”(HBSK2022YB359);湖北经济学院2023年大学生创新创业训练项目“碳汇——湖北新能源汽车碳积分小商城”(S202311600)。

摘　　要：随着双积分办法和碳中和理论的提出,新能源汽车成为汽车行业的主要发展趋势,但是随着政府财政补贴的退坡,新能源汽车的发展动力不足展现出了疲软的态势,市场上传统能源汽车与新能源汽车展现出了两方博弈的态势.该文以补贴政策为前提,具体分析该政策对新能源汽车与传统能源汽车两方博弈的影响,并针对博弈结果市场状况对政策做出建议.With the introduction of the dual integration method and carbon neutrality theory,new energy vehicles have become the main development trend in the automotive industry.However,with the decline of government financial subsidies,the development momentum of new energy vehicles has shown a weak trend,and traditional energy vehicles and new energy vehicles in the market have shown a two party game situation.This paper will take the subsidy policy as a premise,analyze the impact of this policy on the game between new energy vehicles and traditional energy vehicles,and make recommendations for the policy based on the market situation of the game results.

关 键 词：新能源汽车 动态博弈 补贴政策退坡 

分 类 号：U469.7[机械工程—车辆工程]