计及出行行为调整的综合能源系统双层博弈优化策略  

A Two-Layer Game Optimization Operation Strategy for the Electric-Thermal-Hydrogen Integrated Energy System Considering Vehicle Owner Travel Behavior Adjustments

作　　者：贾士铎 康小宁[1] 田博文 崔金旭 萧淑文 李昕盈 JIA Shiduo;KANG Xiaoning;TIAN Bowen;CUI Jinxu;XIAO Shuwen;LI Xinying(School of Electrical Engineering,Xi’an Jiaotong University,Xi’an 710049,China)

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学电气工程学院,西安710049

出　　处：《西安交通大学学报》2024年第4期54-63,共10页Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金中英国际合作研究资助项目(52061635105)。

摘　　要：针对园区综合能源系统中各个主体的利益难以兼顾及新能源汽车出行计划临时变动会对系统运行带来不利影响的问题,提出了考虑车主出行行为调整的电热氢综合能源系统双层博弈优化运行策略。首先,建立以能源运营商(IESO)、负荷聚合商(ULA)和新能源汽车负荷聚合商(NEVLA)为主体的Stackelberg-Shapley双层博弈框架;其次,将双层博弈框架嵌入两阶段模型预测控制滚动调度模型中,并在第1阶段引入惩罚博弈机制,抑制车主按照个人意愿无序改变充电计划的行为;最后,联合沙丘猫优化算法与CPLEX求解器对博弈模型进行求解。仿真结果表明:所提策略与无惩罚博弈机制的滚动优化运行策略及考虑惩罚博弈机制的单断面优化运行策略对比,能源运营商的收益分别提高了4.43%、7.75%,负荷聚合商的剩余价值分别提高了6.48%、12.18%,电动汽车负荷调度成本分别减少了13.64%、4.43%,验证了所提策略具有更好的系统运行经济性。To address the challenge of balancing the interests of various stakeholders within the regional integrated energy system and mitigate the adverse effects of sudden changes in vehicle owners’travel plans on system operation,a two-layer game optimization operation strategy for the electric-thermal-hydrogen integrated energy system is proposed while considering adjustments in the travel plans of vehicle owners.Initially,a two-layer Stackelberg-Shapley game framework is established,with the integrated energy system operator(IESO),user load aggregator(ULA),and new energy vehicle load aggregator(NEVLA)serving as the main entities.Subsequently,the two-layer game framework is embedded into the two-stage model predictive control rolling scheduling model,and the penalty game mechanism is introduced in the first stage to discourage vehicle owners from arbitrarily changing their charging plans.Ultimately,the equilibrium solution of the game model is jointly solved using the sand cat swarm optimization algorithm and CPLEX.The simulation results show that compared with the rolling optimization operation strategy without a penalty game mechanism and the single-section optimization operation strategy considering the penalty game mechanism,the proposed strategy has increased the IESO income by 4.43%and 7.75%,increased the residual value of ULA by 6.48%and 12.18%,and reduced the EV load scheduling cost by 13.64%and 4.43%respectively.The verification demonstrates better economic performance of the proposed strategy in system operation.

关 键 词：出行行为调整 双层博弈 电热氢综合能源系统 滚动优化运行 新能源汽车 

分 类 号：TM73[电气工程—电力系统及自动化]