药品集采中政府与公立医院间的博弈研究  

Research on the Game Between Government and Public Hospitals in Centralized Drug Procurement

作　　者：谢渝嫱 夏新斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南中医药大学,长沙410208 [2]湖南省人民医院/湖南师范大学附属第一医院,长沙410008

出　　处：《中国医疗保险》2024年第3期101-105,共5页China Health Insurance

基　　金：湖南省自然科学部门联合基金“湖南部省属公立医院药品集中带量采购政策实施效果评价研究”(2023JJ60100);2022年度湖南省卫健委重点科研课题“湖南推进现代医院管理制度建设研究”(202215024534)。

摘　　要：目的:探究公立医疗机构完成集采任务的动力,分析影响集采工作效果的因素,为政府实施监管及相关决策提供参考。方法:分析14家三级公立医院前五批国家组织集采药品采购情况,基于博弈论的角度,通过构建政府与医院的博弈模型,求出其纳什均衡解。结果:在医院落实集采政策方面,存在政府监管力度不强、公立医院药品报量逐批下降、参与积极性不高等问题。结论:建议优化政府监管机制,加大日常监管力度,完善激励与约束制度,提高医疗机构纯收益等。Objective:The paper explores the motivation of public medical institutions to complete the task of centralized procurement,analyzes the factors affecting the effect of centralized procurement,and provides a reference for the government to implement supervision and decision-making.Methods:Based on the game theory,the paper analyzes the first five batches of state-organized drug procurement in 14 provincial public hospitals by constructing the game model between government and hospitals.Results:In terms of the implementation of the centralized procurement policy in hospitals,there were problems such as insufficient government supervision,decrease of drug amount declaration in public hospitals and low participation enthusiasm.Conclusion:It is suggested optimizing the government supervision mechanism,strengthening the daily supervision,improving the incentive and restraint system,and improving the net revenue of medical institutions.

关 键 词：药品集中带量采购 政府监管 博弈模型 公立医院 

分 类 号：F840.684[经济管理—保险]