Distributed Nash Equilibrium Seeking on Compact Action Sets over Jointly Strongly Connected Switching Networks  

作　　者：HE Xiongnan HUANG Jie 

机构地区：[1]Department of Mechanical and Automation Engineering,The Chinese University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong 999077,China.

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2024年第1期63-81,共19页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported in part by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region under Grant No.14202619;in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.61973260。

摘　　要：This paper studies the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking(DNES)problem for games whose action sets are compact and whose network graph is switching satisfying the jointly strongly connected condition.To keep the actions of all players in their action sets all the time,one has to resort to the projected gradient-based method.Under the assumption that the unique Nash equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the pseudogradient system,an algorithm is proposed that is able to exponentially find the Nash equilibrium.Further,the authors also consider the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problem for games whose actions are governed by high-order integrator dynamics and belong to some compact sets.Two examples are used to illustrate the proposed approach.

关 键 词：Compact action sets jointly strongly connected switching graphs Nash equilibrium seeking projected gradient-based algorithm. 

分 类 号：O157.5[理学—数学]