Equalizer Zero-Determinant Strategy in Discounted Repeated Stackelberg Asymmetric Game  

作　　者：CHENG Zhaoyang CHEN Guanpu HONG Yiguang 

机构地区：[1]Key Laboratory of Systems and Control,Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science,Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190,China [2]School of Mathematical Sciences,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100049,China [3]School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,KTH Royal Institute of Technology,10044 Stockholm,Sweden. [4]Department of Control Science and Engineering,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China [5]Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems,Tongji University,Shanghai 210201,China

出　　处：《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》2024年第1期184-203,共20页系统科学与复杂性学报（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant No.2022YFA1004700;the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.62173250;Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Major Project under Grant No.2021SHZDZX0100.

摘　　要：This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant(ZD)strategies in discounted repeated Stackelberg asymmetric games.In the leader-follower adversarial scenario,the strong Stackelberg equilibrium(SSE)deriving from the opponents’best response(BR),is technically the optimal strategy for the leader.However,computing an SSE strategy may be difficult since it needs to solve a mixed-integer program and has exponential complexity in the number of states.To this end,the authors propose an equalizer ZD strategy,which can unilaterally restrict the opponent’s expected utility.The authors first study the existence of an equalizer ZD strategy with one-to-one situations,and analyze an upper bound of its performance with the baseline SSE strategy.Then the authors turn to multi-player models,where there exists one player adopting an equalizer ZD strategy.The authors give bounds of the weighted sum of opponents’s utilities,and compare it with the SSE strategy.Finally,the authors give simulations on unmanned aerial vehicles(UAVs)and the moving target defense(MTD)to verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

关 键 词：Discounted repeated Stackelberg asymmetric game equalizer zero-determinant strategy strong Stackelberg equilibrium strategy 

分 类 号：TN911.5[电子电信—通信与信息系统] O225[电子电信—信息与通信工程]