隐私偏好、差异化定价及消费者信息保护政策  

Privacy Preference,Price Discrimination and Regulations on Consumer Information Protection

作　　者：邵小快 郑捷 SHAO Xiaokuai;ZHENG Jie(International Business School,Beijing Foreign Studies University;Center for Economic Research,Shandong University)

机构地区：[1]北京外国语大学国际商学院,100089 [2]山东大学经济研究院,250100

出　　处：《经济研究》2024年第2期190-208,共19页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(72103024);国家自然科学基金面上项目(72073080,71873074)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：在保护消费者信息的基础上如何充分发挥数据价值,对于我国数字经济的健康发展至关重要。本文在水平差异化双寡头模型(Hotelling)的基础上,引入消费者对隐私转让偏好的异质性以及厂商通过获取隐私信息进行获利的可能性,来分析均衡的隐私协议策略及福利影响。双寡头通过对消费者是否披露个人隐私来实施差异化定价,并策略性地提供对应的隐私协议;消费者根据相对价格来选择购买品牌并决定是否向企业提供个人隐私信息。本文研究表明:第一,当让所有客户都不披露隐私的协议和区别对待式隐私协议均可选时,前者被后者所严格占优;第二,当消费者信息对厂商的价值超过消费者暴露隐私所遭受的损失时,通过对不披露隐私的消费者设置威慑性高价来“引致所有消费者自愿披露隐私”是一个对称均衡;第三,当隐私的价值低于披露隐私的损失时,通过价格机制,让在意和不在意隐私损失的消费者分别自愿选择不披露和披露个人隐私(“区别对待”),是占优策略均衡。此外,相较于“强制保护”“不保护”“禁止区别对待”这三类“一刀切”式的隐私政策,允许区别对待并令市场主体自主选择隐私政策能够提高资源配置效率。How to balance the trade-off between protecting consumer privacy and promoting data values becomes an increasingly important issue in the digital era.From the firms’side,consumers’information is valuable for firms’decisions.From the consumers’side,disclosing personal information results in privacy concerns.In theory,in a competitive market,when a firm sells products to a consumer in exchange for the customer’s information,then such a voluntary trade must be Pareto-improving.In practice,firms do this by offering discounts for those who choose to disclose their information.However,in a market with imperfect competition where prices are offered strategically by competing oligopolists,the equilibrium outcomes remain unclear.In this paper,we introduce heterogeneous privacy preferences into a horizontally differentiated duopoly model,to study the pricing and privacy strategies of competing firms and their impacts on equilibrium welfare.In our model,not only do consumers differ in their heterogeneous preferences over the two brands,but they also differ in their disutilities when disclosing personal information.Each consumer chooses to purchase from a particular seller,and during the trade,he/she must also choose whether or not to disclose his/her personal information.Consumers’information generates extra value for the firms in addition to profits brought by selling products alone.Sellers offer prices simultaneously in which the price for those who choose to disclose personal information,and the price for those who do not,are differentiated.Therefore,the privacy strategy of a firm is described by a pair of relative prices.By using a binary distribution(i.e.,when disclosing personal information,some“privacy-sensitive”consumers incur a fixed disutility while the remaining“privacy-insensitive”consumers incur zero disutility),there exist three possible types of privacy agreements:(1)if the price for disclosing information is greater than that for not disclosing,then all consumers will choose not to disclo

关 键 词：消费者隐私 自愿披露 水平差异化 差异化定价 隐私协议 信息保护政策 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F274