“政府市场规制+核心企业绿色采购”视角下中小制造企业污染治理策略演化  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Pollution Governance of Small and Medium-sized Manufacturing Enterprises from the Perspective of“Government Market Regulation+Core Enterprises’Green Procurement”

作　　者：何奇龙 唐娟红 罗兴 HE Qilong;TANG Juanhong;LUO Xing(Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;School of Economic and Management,Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China)

机构地区：[1]郑州大学商学院,河南郑州450001 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第2期218-225,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(72031009);教育部人文社科资助项目(19YJC790091);河南省社科规划项目(2019CJJ087);郑州大学青年人才创新团队支持计划(32320293)。

摘　　要：为破解中小制造企业污染治理困境,探索多主体协同治理新路径,本文构建由地方政府、核心企业、中小制造企业构成的三方演化博弈模型,研究地方政府通过市场规制作用于核心企业,核心企业借助供应链主导优势倒逼中小制造企业污染治理的机理,以及合作共治成为演化稳定均衡的条件和影响因素。研究表明:(1)核心企业主导治理的成本越小、声誉奖励或惩罚越大,越能促进核心企业主导治理,而税收优惠规制手段只有在主导治理成本大于两倍的声誉奖励或惩罚时,才发挥正向激励作用。(2)核心企业绿色采购提升了中小制造企业污染治理积极性,而金融机构绿色信贷作为平衡中小制造企业收益的补充方式,在采购量带来的额外收益小于两倍的治理成本时将发挥正向促进作用。(3)媒体曝光率在中小制造企业污染治理净收益大于不治理净收益时,发挥正向激励作用。(4)博弈主体成本收益满足一定条件时,系统演化稳定于理想的均衡状态(1,1,1)。“地方政府市场规制+核心企业绿色采购”视角下三方行为演化机理的研究,为中小制造企业污染协同治理提供了创新思路。Small and medium-sized enterprises play an important role in national economic development,but they have become the main source of environmental pollution.For example,the Apple supply chain pollution incident caused by the environmental problems of the touch screen supplier resulted in poisoning a number of employees,ruining the reputation of Apple and producing a serious negative social effect.It can be seen that how to reasonably and effectively control the pollution of small and medium-sized enterprises has become an urgent problem to be solved.Scholars’research on pollution control of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises mainly focuses on the mode in which multiple subjects outside the industrial chain,such as the government and the public,participate in pollution control independently.However,the resources and strength of the government,ENGO,the public,financial institutions,scientific research institutions and other multiple subjects are limited,and the cost of participating in pollution control alone is high,which leads to an insufficient motivation and poor effect of pollution control.In fact,the information among the subjects within the supply chain is more symmetric,especially the core enterprises have innate advantages in the information of their upstream and downstream small and medium-sized enterprises,and the environmental governance within the supply chain has involved in the research field.There is more communication between the core enterprise and upstream supplier,and the environmental performance of upstream suppliers also affects the reputation and market competitiveness of core enterprises.Therefore,it is easier for core enterprises to supervise and control the pollution control behavior of small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises.However,the dominant governance of core enterprises often lacks legal constraints.Existing studies have shown that credit resource incentives of financial institutions are the main driving force for core enterprises to fulfill their social resp

关 键 词：市场规制 供应链核心企业 中小制造企业 演化博弈 污染治理 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]