基于前景理论的信息敏感型电子废弃物回收演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information-Sensitive Electronic Waste Recycling Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：王方 尹雪薇 石纯来 余乐安 WANG Fang;YIN Xuewei;SHI Chunlai;YU Lean(School of Economics and Management,Xidian University,Xi’an 710126;Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu 610065)

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,西安710126 [2]四川大学商学院,成都610065

出　　处：《系统科学与数学》2024年第3期694-710,共17页Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72001165,72331007);陕西省创新能力支撑计划资助(2022SR5016);西安市科技计划项目软科学研究重点项目(23RKYJ00006)资助课题。

摘　　要：为破解不完全信息下信息敏感型电子废弃物的回收困境,文章基于前景理论构建了由政府、消费者和回收商组成的演化博弈模型,探讨了影响系统博弈策略的主要因素.结果表明,政府加大监管力度可促进回收市场规范化;消费者负面信誉评价对非正规回收商具有导向性,高负面信誉评价激励非正规回收商规范化形成;回收过程中,消费者若遭受信息泄露损失,便趋向于不信任策略,且信息泄露损失越大不信任程度越深;前景理论中的损失规避系数和损失感知价值敏感系数,对于消费者和回收商的策略均有影响,而收益感知价值敏感系数对两者策略几乎无影响,说明决策者在博弈中更注重规避损失.To solve the dilemma of information-sensitive e-waste recycling under incomplete information,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model composed of government,consumers and recyclers based on prospect theory,and discussed the main factors affecting system game strategy.The results show that the government’s increased supervision can promote the standardization of the recycling market.The negative credit evaluation of consumers is conductive to the informal recyclers.The high negative credit evaluation encourages the normalization of the informal recyclers,while the low negative credit evaluation promotes the informal recycling treatment of the recyclers.In the recycling process,if consumers suffer information leakage losses,they tend to distrust strategies,and the greater the information leakage loss,the deeper the degree of distrust.In addition,the loss factors in prospect theory have an impact on the strategies of consumers and recyclers,while the return factors have almost no effect,indicating policymakers pay more attention to loss aversion in the game.

关 键 词：电子废弃物 前景理论 敏感信息 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济] F426.6F224.32