A survey of decision making in adversarial games  

作　　者：Xiuxian LI Min MENG Yiguang HONG Jie CHEN 

机构地区：[1]College of Electronics and Information Engineering,Tongji University,Shanghai 201804,China [2]Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems,Shanghai 201210,China

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2024年第4期81-108,共28页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：supported by National Key Research and Development Program of China(Grant No.2022ZD0119702);National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.62003243,62103305,62088101);Shanghai Pujiang Program(Grant No.21PJ1413100);Shanghai Municipal Science and Technology Major Project(Grant No.2021SHZDZX0100)。

摘　　要：In many practical applications,such as poker,chess,drug interdiction,cybersecurity,and national defense,players often have adversarial stances,i.e.,the selfish actions of each player inevitably or intentionally inflict loss or wreak havoc on other players.Therefore,adversarial games are important in realworld applications.However,only special adversarial games,such as Bayesian games,are reviewed in the literature.In this respect,this study aims to provide a systematic survey of three main game models widely employed in adversarial games,i.e.,zero-sum normal-form and extensive-form games,Stackelberg(security)games,and zero-sum differential games,from an array of perspectives,including basic knowledge of game models,(approximate)equilibrium concepts,problem classifications,research frontiers,(approximate)optimal strategy-seeking techniques,prevailing algorithms,and practical applications.Finally,promising future research directions are also discussed for relevant adversarial games.

关 键 词：adversarial games zero-sum games Stackelberg games differential games Nash equilibrium correlated equilibrium REGRET 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]