国家重点产业规划、地方政府博弈与市场分割  

National Key Industry Planning,Local Government Game and Market Segmentation

作　　者：张古[1] 罗聪 Zhang Gu;Luo Cong(School of Economics, Lanzhou University)

机构地区：[1]兰州大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济科学》2024年第2期52-73,共22页Economic Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金西部计划项目“‘双循环’背景下中国区域经济格局演变的底层逻辑与路径优化研究”(项目编号:22XJL010)的资助。

摘　　要：国家重点产业规划是政府协调资源配置的重要“指挥棒”,但实施过程中地方政府的同质化竞争可能会给建设全国统一大市场带来市场分割的威胁。本文基于新经济地理学的建模思想,引入博弈论的分析范式,建立了在国家重点产业规划下地方政府间策略选择的竞争模型,并对博弈假设、核心结论和机制进行检验。研究发现:地方政府对国家重点产业规划的盲目追随会引发地方政府间的同质化竞争,进而可能加剧市场分割;设置“高墙”是地方政府的绝对占优策略,能否形成合理的产业分工格局与区域间技术交流及交易成本密切相关;地方保护与本地整体产能间呈现倒U形关系,持续高涨的区域壁垒不利于产能红利的释放。National key industry planning serves as an important tool for the government to allocate resource,which creates homogenized competition among local governments and causes a problem of market segmentation in the construction of a unified national market.This paper,based on the modeling ideas of New Economic Geography,introduces the paradigm of game theory for strategic choices analysis among local governments under the national key industry planning.It then empirically examines game assumptions,core conclusions,and mechanisms derived from theoretical model.The study reveals that:(1) National key industry planning induces homogenized imitative behavior among local governments,leading to market segmentation;(2) Erecting trading barriers is a dominant strategy for local governments in market segmentation,and the formation of a reasonable industrial division pattern is closely related to the technological exchange and trade cost among regions;(3) There exists an “inverted U-shaped” relationship between local protection and overall local production capacity,with continuous high regional barriers being detrimental to the release of production capacity potential.

关 键 词：国家重点产业规划 地方政府博弈 市场分割 统一大市场 新经济地理学 

分 类 号：F207[经济管理—国民经济]