公益性小额信贷的关系成本与合约效果——信贷合约的社会学分析  

Public Welfare Microfinance’s Relational Cost and Contract Effect:A Sociological Analysis of Credit Contract

作　　者：程士强 CHENG Shiqiang

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学社会与心理学院

出　　处：《社会学评论》2024年第2期131-152,共22页Sociological Review of China

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“互联网金融风险的空间流动性与治理机制研究”(20CSH065)。

摘　　要：本文从信贷合约的角度比较了四种公益性小额信贷模式,尝试找出导致合约效果差异的内在机理。这四种模式均具有关系合约特征,且试图对关系因素进行标准化、规范化的合约设计。关系合约是一种应对信贷交易中的信息不对称和违约风险的治理机制,但关系在信贷合约中的作用具有两面性。本文提出关系成本的概念,用以衡量与比较关系带来的负担和负面影响。作为一种正规化、标准化的关系合约,公益性小额信贷在使关系型贷款的市场范围实现扩展的同时,也承担着不同程度的关系成本。该成本包括结构摩擦和关系负荷两部分,结构摩擦与合约效果之间呈单调负相关关系,而关系负荷与合约效果之间呈倒U形曲线关系。This paper compares and analyzes the public welfare microfinance models from the perspective of credit contracts to identify the underlying mecha⁃nisms that affect the differences in contract effectiveness.The four main models of public welfare microfinance all have characteristics of relational contracts and attempt to standardize and normalize contract design for relational factors.The relational contract is a governance mechanism to deal with information asymmetry and default risk in credit transactions,but the role of the relationship in a credit contract has two sides.This paper puts forward the concept of relational cost to measure and compare the burden and negative impact of the relationship.As a formal and standardized relational contract,public welfare microfinance not only expands the market scope of relationship lending,but also bears varying degrees of relational costs.The relational cost of public welfare microfinance includes relational load and structural friction.There is a monotonic negative correlation between structural friction and contract effect,while an inverted U-shaped curve exists between relational load and contract effect.

关 键 词：公益性小额信贷 信贷合约 关系合约 关系成本 关系型贷款 

分 类 号：C91[经济管理] F830.5[社会学]