突发公共卫生事件沟通困境与破解之道——博弈理论视角  

Communication Dilemma of Public Health Emergencies and the Way to Crack it-Game Theory Perspective

作　　者：杨舒雨 谭爽[1] Yang Shuyu;Tan Shuang(School of Law and Humanities,China University of Mining&Technology(Beijing),Beijing 100083,China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学(北京)文法学院,北京100083

出　　处：《青岛医药卫生》2024年第2期141-144,共4页Qingdao Medical Journal

基　　金：北京市社科基金,项目编号:22GLB015。

摘　　要：风险沟通是应对突发公共卫生事件的关键环节,突发公共卫生事件显露出我国仍存在信息传递匹配度不高、沟通主体间有信息差、公众被动接受信息等沟通问题。从博弈论视角来看,网络媒体对流量变现的盲目追求使其在与主流媒体的博弈中呈现非合作性,大量不实谣言的传播对公众风险认知造成误导。同时,中央政府与地方政府在政策执行过程中存在着“委托代理博弈”,引起执行走样、虚假执行等问题,最终形成沟通困局。为打破沟通主体博弈的纳什均衡,需要祛除商业媒体的“经济人假设”,通过多次重复博弈构建合作共赢的央地关系,在政府、媒体、公众三方协商的沟通机制下,建立起官方—民间互为引导,求同存异的话语生态,发挥风险沟通对集体行动的正向调节作用。Risk communication is a key link in the response to public health emergencies,and public health emergencies have revealed that there are still communication problems in China,such as poor matching of information transmission,information gap between communication sub-jects,and passive acceptance of information by the public.From the perspective of game theory,online media's blind pursuit of cash flow makes them non-cooperative in the game with main-stream media,and the spread of a large number of false rumors misleads the public's risk percep-tion.At the same time,the central government and local governments have a“principal-agent game”in the process of policy implementation,which leads to problems such as implementation deviation and false implementation,and ultimately creates a communication dilemma.In order to break the Nash equilibrium of the communication subject game,it is necessary to get rid of the commercial media's“economic man assumption”,build a win-win relationship between the central and local governments through repeated games,and establish a discourse ecosystem in which the government,the media,and the public consult with each other under the tripartite negotiation communication mechanism,so that they can guide each other and seek common ground while re-serving differences.In this way,risk communication can play a positive role in regulating collec-tive action.

关 键 词：博弈论 突发公共卫生事件 风险沟通 媒体参与 政府部门沟通 

分 类 号：R184[医药卫生—流行病学]