重大工程DB模式下设计施工方的社会责任激励契约设计  

Design of Social Responsibility Incentive Contract for Designer and Builder in DB Mode of Megaproject

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作  者:薛凤 陈光宇[2] 谢欢 税发萍 XUE Feng;CHEN Guang-yu;XIE Huan;SHUI Fa-ping;无(School of Mathematics,Chendgu Normal University,Chengdu 611130,China;School of Management and Economics,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China;Sichuan Provincial Branch of Southwest Regional Headquarters of China Communications Construction Company Ltd,Chengdu 610218,China)

机构地区:[1]成都师范学院数学学院,四川成都611130 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731 [3]中国交通建设股份有限公司西南区域四川省域总部,四川成都610218

出  处:《系统工程》2024年第2期1-10,共10页Systems Engineering

基  金:国家自然科学基金重点项目(7153003);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72101172);中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2021M692375)。

摘  要:针对重大工程设计施工总承包模式(DB模式)下,设计施工方社会责任缺失或履责不到位而导致工程效率低、负面影响大等问题,结合重大工程社会责任的特点,引入行为经济学中的公平偏好理论,建立双边道德风险下以工程总收益为目标的激励模型,进而解出最优社会责任努力水平和最优激励系数等均衡值,并与不考虑双边道德风险的履责收益分享模型进行比较分析,得出以下结论:适度的公平偏好会增强施工方和设计方的竞争意识,一定程度上可以提高双方的社会责任努力水平;契约设计需兼顾公平和效率,分配比例需根据双方的社会责任投入产出效率和公平关切程度动态调整,才能协调总收益最优;考虑双边道德风险的契约设计可实现工程总收益的帕累托改进。所得结论为促进重大工程实施主体提高社会责任履责能力和水平提供了理论方法和决策依据。In view of the megaproject design and construction general contracting mode(DB mode), aiming at the problems of low engineering efficiency and great negative impact caused by the lack of social responsibility of the design and construction parties under the DB mode of major engineering design and construction, based on the characteristics of social responsibility of megaprojects, the equity preference theory in behavioral economics is introduced, and the incentive model aiming at total project revenue under bilateral moral hazard is established. Then, the equilibrium values such as the optimal social responsibility effort level and the optimal incentive coefficient are obtained, and compared with the profit sharing model without considering moral hazard, the following conclusions are drawn: The moderate fairness preference will enhance the competition consciousness of the construction and design parties, and to some extent, the social responsibility effort level of both parties can be improved. The contract design should take into account both fairness and efficiency, and the allocation ratio should be dynamically adjusted according to the input-output efficiency of social responsibility and the degree of fairness concern of both parties, so as to achieve the optimal total project revenue. Contract design considering bilateral moral hazard can achieve Pareto improvement of total project revenue.

关 键 词:重大工程社会责任 可持续发展 公平偏好 双边道德风险 激励契约 

分 类 号:C931[经济管理—管理学]

 

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