重大工程协同创新资源共享博弈与仿真分析  

Game and Simulation Analysis of Collaborative Innovation Resource Sharing in Megaprojects

作　　者：刘娜娜 周国华[1] 王肖 LIU Na-na;ZHOU Guo-hua;WANG Xiao(School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China;Sichuan-Tibet Railway Technology Innovation Center Co.,Ltd.,Chengdu 610000,China)

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]川藏铁路技术创新中心有限公司,四川成都610000

出　　处：《系统工程》2024年第2期51-59,共9页Systems Engineering

基　　金：四川省科技厅资助课题(2021ZYD0100);国家自然科学基金重大专项(71942006)。

摘　　要：从协同创新资源要素的角度,以重大工程协同创新资源需求方和资源提供方为研究对象,基于有限理性假设构建了演化博弈收益支付矩阵及演化博弈系统动力学模型,通过求解及分析发现系统存在五个均衡策略点,其中两个为演化稳定策略。应用Vensim软件对五种均衡状态及主要变量的敏感性进行仿真分析,研究发现:降低资源共享前期成本和机会成本、提高共享资源的产出系数和参与协同创新的声誉效应对促进资源共享行为具有显著的正向作用;协同创新收益分配比例对资源共享行为的影响并不是单一的,而是存在一个临界点,当小于临界点时为正向作用,当大于临界点时为负向作用。From the perspective of collaborative innovation resource elements, taking the demand side and resource provider of collaborative innovation resources of major projects as the research object, this paper constructs the evolutionary game revenue payment matrix and evolutionary game system dynamics model based on the bounded rationality hypothesis. By solving and analyzing, it is found that there are five equilibrium strategy points in the system, two of which are evolutionary stability strategy. The sensitivity of five equilibrium states and main variables are simulated and analyzed by Vensim software. It is found that reducing the initial cost and opportunity cost of resource sharing, improving the output coefficient of shared resources and the reputation effect of participating in collaborative innovation have a significant positive effect on promoting resource sharing behavior;The impact of income distribution ratio of collaborative innovation on resource sharing behavior is not single, but there is a critical point. When it is less than the critical point, it is a positive effect, and when it is greater than the critical point, it is a negative effect.

关 键 词：协同创新 资源共享 重大工程 系统动力学 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]