我国基本养老保险基金征缴的策略性互动行为分析  

Strategic Interactive Behaviors of Basic Pension Premium Collection in China

作　　者：王雪辉 WANG Xue-hui

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学会展与传播学院

出　　处：《保险研究》2024年第2期96-110,共15页Insurance Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目“统筹改革背景下我国地方政府基本养老金收缴的策略性互动行为与机制研究”(23YJCZH225)。

摘　　要：基本养老金作为退休职工的主要收入来源,是实现“老有所养”美好生活所需的经济基础和重要保障。本文基于两区制空间杜宾模型探讨了我国地方政府在基本养老保险基金征缴方面的差异化策略性互动行为。研究发现:随着基本养老保险基金收支压力提高,我国地方政府养老保险基金实际征缴率呈“倒U型”变化趋势;地方政府对基本养老保险基金征缴的策略性互动存在于地理邻近与经济邻近的地区间,受软、硬预算约束的影响,地理邻近地区间表现为“模仿行为”,经济邻近地区间表现为“逐顶竞争”;基金征缴的策略性互动行为存在显著的时间阶段性与区域异质性;随着养老保险基金收支压力的提高,地方政府对养老保险基金征缴的策略性互动增强。As the main source of income for retirees,the social basic pension program is the financial foundation of and important guarantee for realizing the good life of“adequate elderly provision”,This paper explores the differentiated strategic interactive behaviors of local governments in basic pension premium collection based on the Two-regime Spatial Durbin Model.The results of the empirical study arrives at the following findings.Firstly,as the pressure on the basic pension program's income and expenditure increases,the local governments'premium collection rate shows an inverted U-shaped trend and is influenced by soft and hard budget constraints.Secondly,the strategic interactive behaviors of local governments on the premium collection exist between geographically and economically adjacent regions;the strategic interactive behavior between geographically adjacent regions is mainly characterized by“imitative behaviors”,versus“topping competition”between economically adjacent regions.Thirdly,the strategic interactive behavior varies significantly across time and regions.Finally,as the pressure on pension income and expenditure increases,the strategic interaction of local governments on premium collection increases.

关 键 词：基本养老金 策略性互动 软预算约束 两区制空间杜宾模型 

分 类 号：F842.67[经济管理—保险] F249.2