考虑公众参与和规制俘获的央地企环境行为的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Environmental Behavior of Central Governments,Local Governments and Firms Considering Public Participation and Regulatory Capture

作　　者：金波 JIN Bo(Department of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan University,Taiyuan 030032,China)

机构地区：[1]太原学院财经系,山西太原030032

出　　处：《经济问题》2024年第5期96-105,共10页On Economic Problems

基　　金：山西省回国留学人员科研资助项目“黄河中游能源聚集区产业结构绿色转型升级评价研究”(2021-141);山西省教育科学“十四五”规划课题“智慧教育背景下应用型高校新商科人才培养模式数字化转型研究”(SZH-230003)。

摘　　要：在环境压力日益增大的情境中,有效的环境治理不仅是提升生态质量的关键,也是确保社会经济可持续发展的必要条件。基于演化博弈理论,结合规制俘获并引入公众参与作为主要参数构建中央政府、地方政府和企业的三方博弈模型,探究了各博弈主体的策略选择及其影响因素,并分析了系统均衡点的稳定性。结论表明:企业选择绿色转型主要取决于转型的成本和收益,在缺乏各级政府监管情况下企业转型收益的提高有利于企业主动转型;中央政府的策略选择受到成本收益的制约,公众环境关注度的增加可以有效推动中央政府选择监督策略;地方政府是否被规制俘获的关键在于其监督成本的高低和对经济的偏好程度。In recent years,the frequent occurrence of environmental pollution incidents has exposed problems such as the lack of supervision by the Chinese government and the ineffective channels for public complaints.This paper combines regulation capture and introduces public participation as the main parameter to construct a tripar-tite game model among the central government,local government and enterprises,explores the strategic choices of each game player and its influencing factors,and analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the system.The conclusion shows that the choice of green transformation mainly depends on the costs and benefits of transforma-tion.The strategic choice of the central government is restricted by the cost and benefit.The increase of public envi-ronmental attention can effectively promote the central government to choose the supervision strategy.The key to the local government not being captured by regulation lies in its supervision cost and the degree of preference for the economy.

关 键 词：规制俘获 公众参与 演化博弈 环境治理 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]