基于演化博弈的电子废弃物回收产业链协同治理  被引量:1

On Collaborative Governance of Electronic Waste Recycling Industry Chain Based on Evolutionary Game

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作  者:刘永清[1] 刘文浩 陈爱妩[1] LIU Yongqing;LIU Wenhao;CHEN Aiwu(School of Business,Hunan University of Science and Technology,Xiangtan 411201,China)

机构地区:[1]湖南科技大学商学院,湖南湘潭411201

出  处:《湖南科技大学学报(自然科学版)》2024年第1期104-114,共11页Journal of Hunan University of Science And Technology:Natural Science Edition

基  金:湖南省社科基金重点资助项目(21ZDB020)。

摘  要:电子废弃物回收产业链的发展需要多方利益相关者的协同参与.从协同治理视角出发,分别构建市场机制下和政府调控下的“回收企业—生产企业”演化博弈模型,通过复制动态方程得到博弈双方的稳定策略演化路径.研究表明:单一主体的收益最大化未必有利于产业的形成和回收产业效益的最大化;博弈双方会基于自身成本收益禀赋和策略带来的增值量进行反复博弈,从而使博弈系统形成不同的演化路径;在市场机制下,博弈系统趋于理想化均衡状态的条件较难得到满足,政府调控可以快速地引导博弈系统向理想状态演化,提升监管效率、加大补贴和对投机行为的惩罚力度能够促进回收产业链的良性发展.The construction and development of e-waste recycling industry need the joint efforts of multi-stakeholders.From the perspective of collaborative governance,the paper constructs the evolutionary game model of"recycling enterprise-production enterprise"under the market mechanism and government regulation,and obtains the stable strategy evolution path of both sides of the game by the copying and dynamic equation.Results show that the maximization of single subject's income may not necessarily lead to the industrial chain and its maximized benefit.Under the market mechanism,it is difficult to meet the condition that the game system area tends to an ideal equilibrium state.And both sides of the game will repeatedly play games based on the initial endowment and result of strategy,thus forming different evolutionary paths.Government regulation can quickly guide the game system to an ideal state.Increasing subsidies,improving regulatory efficiency and punishing speculative behavior can promote the development of the electronic waste recycling industry chain.

关 键 词:电子废弃物 回收产业链 协同治理 演化博弈 

分 类 号:F205[经济管理—国民经济] X705[环境科学与工程—环境工程]

 

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