碳交易机制引导下可再生能源发电企业创新策略研究——基于演化博弈视角  

Research on Innovation Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Enterprises under the Background of Carbon Trading Mechanism——from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

作　　者：程承 安润飞 董康银 任晓航 王震[4] 赵国浩[5] Cheng Cheng;An Runfei;Dong Kangyin;Ren Xiaohang;Wang Zhen;Zhao Guohao(School of Management and Science,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China;School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029,China;Business School,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China;School of Economics and Management,China University of Petroleum-Beijing,Beijing,102249,China;School of Business Administration,Shanxi University of Finance and Economics,Taiyuan 030006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院,山西太原030006 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院,北京100029 [3]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [4]中国石油大学(北京)经济管理学院,北京102249 [5]山西财经大学工商管理学院,山西太原030006

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第3期82-94,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大专项项目(23VMG006);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71904111);湖南省教育厅优秀青年项目(23B0004);山西财经大学2023年“山财学者”支持计划。

摘　　要：碳交易市场为可再生能源发电企业开展技术创新带来额外收益,进而影响政府与企业间的演化博弈关系。鉴于此,本文研究了碳交易机制引导下的可再生能源发电企业技术创新行为与政府激励之间的演化博弈问题。具体而言,本文在考虑企业研发成功率的前提下,对企业创新行为的成本和收益进行折现,并据此构建支付矩阵,分析得到政府静态奖惩和动态奖惩两种情境下的演化稳定策略,重点分析了动态奖惩机制下企业研发成本、研发成功率、额外购置技术成本等参数对系统演化稳定策略的影响。算例分析结果表明:①动态奖惩机制下,双方存在着唯一的演化稳定策略。②碳市场的完善与发展将使可再生能源发电企业利用市场力量实现技术创新。③电价市场化可从一定程度上推动发电行业技术创新。④降低政府激励成本可促使企业创新。研究结果对可再生能源发电企业制定创新决策、政府制定激励政策具有一定的启示作用。Technological innovation is crucial for the renewable power generation enterprises as it can help the enterprises to gain additional profits and reduce their costs.However,the cost of technological innovation is huge.Therefore,the Chinese government tend to provide subsidy to facilitate the innovation process related to renewable technology.As a result,the Chinese government and renewable power generation enterprises are two players with regards to technological innovation and incentive policy.The establishment of trading market of carbon emission changes the game as renewable enterprises can obtain additional profits by involving in Chinese Certified Emission Reduction(CCER)market.Therefore,it is necessary to investigate the new game between renewable power generation enterprises and the Chinese government under the background of carbon trading mechanism.The evolutionary game related to the innovation behavior of renewable energy enterprises and incentive issues of the government is studied.By considering the success probability of research and development(R&D),R&D cycle time and other factors,the discounted costs and benefits related to the innovation behavior are obtained.Then,the payoff matrix based on these parameters are established.The evolutionary stable strategy of both the static incentive and punishment scenario and the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario are obtained.Moreover,the impact of the continuous R&D cost,success probability,additional purchase cost and other parameters is analyzed in the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario.The results indicate that:There exists a unique evolutionary stable strategy for both parties in the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario.The development of emission trading market is beneficial for the technologi⁃cal innovation as it utilized the power of invisible hand provided by emission trading market.The marketization of power prices can also improve the technological levels in renewable energy industry.The government can also stimulate the process

关 键 词：创新策略 碳减排 可再生能源 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济] F224.32