透明度危机?——谈判视角下的国际遵约研究  

Transparency Crisis?International Compliance from a Bargaining Perspective

作　　者：卢晓 Lu Xiao(Assistant Professor at the School of International Studies,Peking University)

机构地区：[1]北京大学国际关系学院,北京100871

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2024年第3期32-67,156,157,共38页World Economics and Politics

基　　金：北京大学学科建设项目“欧盟及其成员国决策机制研究”(项目批准号:7100604301)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：百年变局下国际违约现象频发,成为阻碍世界和平与发展的重要风险。既有遵约研究主要考察国际协定签署后主权国家的履约情况、国际机制的监督效果和防范违约的制裁机制,很大程度上忽视了对国际政策制定过程特别是谈判过程同国际遵约结果间关系的系统讨论。对国际谈判和遵约间关系进行逻辑推演和理论建构有助于探明国际谈判过程影响国际违约行为的机制,为解释国际遵约和违约现象提供新的理论路径。研究表明,提高谈判透明度并不必然改善国际遵约效果。透明度相对较低的闭门谈判由于较高的政策制定效率和对敏感信息与社会舆论的适度控制,一定条件下能够提高主权国家的遵约意愿。此外,谈判过程对国际遵约结果的影响受制于公众信任程度等内生性因素。在公众信任程度较高的政治环境下,对国际协定合法性的担忧较低,闭门谈判能够更好地发挥效率优势,推动国际协定的制定和履行。本项研究同时揭示了“民主遵约论”的局限性,高效、可信的国际政策制定过程对国际遵约具有积极作用。The violation of international agreements poses an important risk to global peace and development.While previous research has focused on the behavior of sovereign states after signing international agreements,the impact of international monitoring agencies on compliance,and the use of sanctions to prevent noncompliance,little attention has been paid to the influence of the international policy-making process on compliance outcomes.This study aims to fill this gap by developing and empirically examining a game theoretical model of closed-door bargaining that not only affects the outcome of an international agreement but also its compliance.This paper argues that states face uncertainty regarding the biases of their representatives in international negotiations.Under uncertainty,the information obtained from the bargaining process is crucial for states to update their beliefs about representative biases,which in turn impacts compliance with international agreements.Closed-door bargaining,in which only the final agreement is observable,conceals biased representatives and,under certain conditions,encourages compliance.Furthermore,the impact of the bargaining process on international compliance outcomes is contingent on endogenous factors like public trust.In a political environment with high public trust and minimal concerns about the legitimacy of international agreements,closed-door negotiations can enhance efficiency and facilitate the formulation and implementation of international agreements.Using a most recent data set from the European Union,this paper empirically examines the theoretical implications derived from the model and finds support for the argument.The study also demonstrates the conditionality of democratic compliance theory and highlights the positive effect of an efficient and credible international policy-making process on compliance.

关 键 词：国际遵约 国际谈判 欧盟 博弈论 谈判透明度 

分 类 号：D815[政治法律—国际关系]