上市公司控制人侵占行为研究——基于控制权与现金流权的视角  

Research on the Encroachment Behavior of Controllers of Listed Companies——Based on the Perspective of Separation of Control Rights and Cash Flow Rights

作　　者：张磊 ZHANG Lei

机构地区：[1]江苏银行兴化支行,江苏兴化225799

出　　处：《吉林金融研究》2024年第2期37-44,75,共9页Journal of Jilin Financial Research

摘　　要：由于上市公司的股票价值与公司治理密切相关,良好的公司治理对于公司价值具有显著的提升效果,控制人的过度侵占行为则会降低公司价值。本文将基于微观角度,以上市公司治理为目标,通过建立双重股权结构模型、金字塔股权结构模型、交叉持股股权结构模型,分析现金流权与控制权的分配在公司治理中的表现。本文研究发现,国有企业比私营企业有着更大的控制权侵占放大系数,现金流权与控制权的分离将增加控制人的侵占行为,发生过度投资行为。目前,上市企业依然有着较强的侵占预期,为了减少过度侵占行为,保护股东利益和维护公司价值,本文建议通过在内部提升治理机制和外部增加监督成本的方式,来增强公司对资源的分配效率。Due to the stock value of listed companies is closely related to corporate governance,good corporate governance has a significant effect on corporate value and excessive embezzlement of control people can reduce the value of the corporate.This paper will be based on the microscopic perspective and make the governance of listed companies as a target.Through the establishment of dual shareholding structure model,pyramid shareholding structure model and cross-shareholding structure model,this paper will analysis the right of distribution between cash flow right and control right in the corporate governance performance.The study found that state-owned enterprise has more control of the amplification coefficient than the private enterprise.The separation of cash flow rights and control will increase the control of embezzlement,excessive investment behavior in state-owned enterprise.At present,in the market of listed company still has a marginal increasing rapidly occupation expectation.In order to reduce excessive occupation behavior,protect the interest of shareholder and maintain the valve of corporate,this paper suggest that through improving the internal governance mechanism and increasing external supervision cost,the allocation efficiency of listed companies will significantly be enhanced.

关 键 词：现金流权 控制权 公司治理 侵占收益 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]