零售商存在破产风险的双层供应链中的信贷决策  

Credit Decisions in the Two-level Supply Chain in the Presence of the Retailer’s Bankruptcy Risk

作　　者：丁雯 赵文辉 万国华[2] Ding Wen;Zhao Wenhui;Wan Guohua(School of Business Administration,Zhejiang University of Finance&Economics,Hangzhou 310018;Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学管理学院,杭州310018 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《管理评论》2024年第2期236-245,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目(71421002);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72302209);国家自然科学基金重点项目(72131010,72232001);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(22YJC630019);上海高校特聘教授(东方学者)项目(TP2022019)。

摘　　要：对于资金缺乏的零售商,银行融资和供应商的信贷融资是其主要的两个资金获取渠道。考虑零售商存在破产风险情境,对竞争性传统银行及资金充裕供应商的信贷融资方式进行了比较分析。结果表明,对资金充裕型供应商,由于通过对零售商提供信贷支持可获得更高的利润,因此他们更倾向于对零售商订货提供信贷支持;对资金缺乏型供应商,即使需从外部获取资金支持,比如抵押贷款,他们也愿意给零售商提供信贷支持。但是,对于零售商拥有谈判权力的情境,上述结论未必一定成立。事实上,当零售商的谈判能力较强时,供应商提供信贷融资时其利润可能减少,从而改变其提供信贷融资的意愿;进一步,在供应商提供信贷融资情况下,其利润会随着零售商破产风险的增大而增加。For capital-constrained retailers,bank financing and supplier financing are two important sources of funding.In this paper,we compare the two financing methods when the retailer has the risk of bankruptcy.Our analyses show that because of higher profit,the supplier with sufficient capital is more inclined to finance the retailer.For suppliers lacking capital,they are willing to finance the retailer even if they must borrow from outside using financing methods such as mortgage.However,when the retailer has the bargaining power,these results may not hold any more.In fact,the supplier who provides financing may get a lower profit.The analyses show that with supplier financing,the supplier’s profit increases with the retailer’s risk of bankruptcy.

关 键 词：银行信贷 供应商信贷 破产风险 谈判能力 抵押贷款 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F274