斯特根加对种群个体论的质疑和对种群多元论的辩护  

Stegenga's Questioning of Population Individualism and Defense of Population Pluralism

作　　者：肖显静 张亚玲[1] XIAO Xian-jing;ZHANG Ya-ling(Research Center for Philosophy of Science and Technology,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China;Institute of Science,Technology and Society,South China Normal University,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]山西大学科学技术哲学研究中心,太原030006 [2]华南师范大学科学技术与社会研究院,广州510006

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第2期1-8,共8页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“生态学范式争论的哲学研究”(16ZDA112);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期资助重大项目“科学思想史:自然观变革、方法论创新与科学革命”(22JHQ003)。

摘　　要：斯特根加认为米尔斯坦提出的因果相互作用者种群定义存在模糊性、无效性和过度限制性的问题,并进一步认为其种群个体论是不成立的。米尔斯坦对此给予回应,认为斯特根加的质疑没有道理。斯特根加继而对种群个体论展开了进一步的批判,认为米尔斯坦因果相互作用者种群概念所代表的狭义种群定义,面临无数概念上的困难和反例,因果相互作用在认识论上是不可能的。在提出种群多元论的基础上,斯特根加通过回应米尔斯坦对种群多元论不一致使用、事实不确定和划界负担的质疑,以及分析进化论中关于自然选择的相关争论,进一步为他的种群多元论辩护。斯特根加的种群多元论有一定合理性,种群一元论也不无道理,应该在两者之间保持必要的张力。Stegenga argues that the causal interactionist population definition proposed by Millstein suffers from ambiguity,invalidity,and over-restrictiveness,and further believes that her population individualism is not valid.Millstein responds to this by arguing that Stegenga's challenge is unwarranted.Stegenga goes on to develop a further critique of population individualism,arguing that the narrow definitions of population represented by Millstein's causal interactionist population concept faces numerous conceptual difficulties and counter-examples,and that causal interactions are epistemologically impossible.On the basis of proposing population pluralism,Stegenga further defends his population pluralism by responding to Millstein's questioning of the inconsistent usage,factual indeterminacy and burden of demarcation of population pluralism,as well as analyzing the relevant debates on natural selection in evolution.While Stegenga's population pluralism has some rationality,population monism is also reasonable,so the necessary tension between the two should be maintained.

关 键 词：斯特根加 种群多元论 种群个体论 因果相互作用 实在论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]