数字永生虚拟人的主体问题及其伦理向度  

The Problem of Subjectivity and Ethical Orientation of Digital Immortal Virtual Human

作　　者：张彭松[1] 王明迪 ZHANG Peng-song;WANG Ming-di(School of Philosophy,Heilongjiang University,Harbin 150080,China)

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学哲学学院,哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2024年第2期79-85,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“科学精神与人文精神融合的实践经验论研究”(22BZX034)。

摘　　要：“数字永生”是指基于个人信息数据创建具有个体特征的虚拟人,将其作为人的数字化身接替人实现“永生”。虚拟人是否具有主体性是数字永生得以成立的前提。文章考察了数字永生的三种形态,针对虚拟人是否具有主体性的立场,分别从数字身份、虚拟意识与虚拟人格三个方面论证虚拟人无法具备主体性,不能帮助人实现永生。尽管如此,数字永生仍有其伦理价值,在情感疗愈等方面发挥着独特作用,宏观上还会影响死亡伦理观的发展趋势。对虚拟人主体问题的探究有助于人们理解数字永生的实质,正确看待数字永生在人类社会生活中的作用与位置。"Digital immortality"refers to the creation of a virtual human with individual characteristics based on personal information data,which can be used as a digital successor to a human being to achieve"immortality".Whether a virtual human has subjectivity is a prerequisite for digital immortality to be established.The article examines three forms of digital immortality and argues that the virtual person cannot have subjectivity and cannot help people achieve immortality from three aspects:digital identity,virtual consciousness and virtual personality.Nevertheless,digital immortality still has its ethical value,playing a unique role in emotional healing and influencing the trend of the ethical view of death on a macro level.An exploration of the subject matter of digital immortality can help people understand the essence of digital immortality and correctly view its role and place in human social life.

关 键 词：数字永生 虚拟人 聊天机器人 主体性 情感价值 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]