公平偏好下公共产品技术创新委托联合研发策略  

Joint research and development strategy of entrusting subcontractors for public goods technological innovation based on fairness preference

作　　者：武柏宇 仲伟俊[1] 梅姝娥[1] Wu Baiyu;Zhong Weijun;Mei Shu’e(School of Economics and Management,Southeast University,Nanjing 211189,China;Business School,Yangzhou University,Yangzhou 225127,China)

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189 [2]扬州大学商学院,江苏扬州225127

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2024年第2期217-232,共16页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家重点研发计划资助项目(2023YFC3804901).

摘　　要：为厘清公共产品技术创新中双重依赖下分包商横向公平偏好对公共部门契约设计和期望收益的影响,构建基于公平偏好的单委托人–双代理人的模型.求解发现,随机依赖和分包商公平偏好对间接激励系数具有相反的影响,孰强孰弱影响了最优合同类型;而调整后的奖励分配更偏袒公平偏好较强的一方,导致其获得团队绩效合同的优势逐渐明显;公共部门针对分包商公平偏好进行的激励调整可以使自己获益,但不能忽视分包商的相对贡献,否则激励效果适得其反.因此,公共部门若想从激励强度调整中获益必须协调好双方的公平偏好与贡献大小.To clarify the impact of subcontractor’s horizontal fairness on the contract design and expected re-turn of public sector under random dependence and technology dependence in the public goods technological innovation,this paper constructed a single-principal and dual-agents model based on fairness.The results show that random dependence and subcontractor’s fairness have opposite effects on the indirect incentive coefficient,which determines the optimal contract type.However,the adjusted reward distribution of the public sector favored the party with stronger fairness,which makes it the optimal choice to provide the subcontractor team performance contract.The public sector’s incentive adjustment for the fair preference of subcontractors can benefit itself,but the relative contribution of subcontractors cannot be ignored,otherwise the incentive adjust-ment is counterproductive.Therefore,if the public sector wants to benefit from the adjustment of incentive intensity,it must coordinate the fairness preference and contribution of both sides.

关 键 词：公共产品技术创新 联合研发 公平偏好 双重依赖 合同类型 

分 类 号：G304[文化科学]