原始设备制造商和再制造商的经营目标演化稳定策略  

Evolutionary stable strategies for marketing objective of original equipment manufacturers and independent remanufacturers

作　　者：孙林洋 易余胤[1] SUN Linyang;YI Yuyin(School of Management,Jinan University,Guangzhou 510632,China)

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《计算机集成制造系统》2024年第4期1446-1457,共12页Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71571086);广东省自然科学基金资助项目(2021A1515012002)。

摘　　要：利润最大化(P策略)和收入最大化(R策略)是两种常见的经营目标策略。为了研究在消费者对新产品和再制造品支付意愿不一致情况下,原始设备制造商(OEMs)和再制造商(IRs)在长期动态的竞争环境中如何选择经营目标策略的问题,构建了OEMs和IRs组成的双群体演化博弈模型。研究发现,OEMs和IRs对经营目标策略的选择主要取决于消费者最大支付意愿以及新产品和再制造品成本比值,而消费者对再制造品支付意愿的折扣系数对OEMs和IRs的经营目标的演化稳定策略也产生了重要的影响。Profit maximization(P strategy)and revenue maximization(R strategy)are two common marketing objective strategies.In the case of the inconsistent consumers′willingness to pay for new products and remanufactured products,to study the choose of marketing objective strategies for Original Equipment Manufacturers(OEMs)and Independent Remanufacturers(IRs)in the long-term dynamic competitive environment,an evolutionary game model for a two-population of OEMs and IRs was developed.The results showed that the strategy choice of marketing objectives of OEMs and IRs mainly depended on the maximum consumers’willingness to pay and the ratio of cost between new products and remanufactured products,and the discount coefficient of consumers’willingness to pay for remanufactured products also had a great influence on the evolutionary stability of marketing objective strategies.

关 键 词：演化博弈 利润最大化 收入最大化 再制造 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]