基于合作博弈论的电梯修建成本分摊博弈  

Cooperative-game-based cost-sharing in elevator installation

作　　者：吴靖伟 谭志斌 曹志刚 WU Jingwei;TAN Zhibin;CAO Zhigang(School of Economics,Central University of Finance and Economics,100081;School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,100044,Beijing,PRC)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学经济学院,100081 [2]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京市100044

出　　处：《曲阜师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第2期9-20,F0002,共13页Journal of Qufu Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(72271016,71922003);北京市自然科学基金(Z220001)。

摘　　要：老旧小区加装电梯是目前城镇化建设中的一个重要议题.问题的关键之一是如何在需求和收益高度异质的业主间分摊电梯安装成本.该文以合作博弈论为基础构建了电梯博弈模型,证明了电梯博弈为凸博弈,并给出了两类基于最小支撑树博弈的推广Bird配置,其中第二类推广Bird配置与现行的成本分摊机制很相似,且满足成本单调性、人口单调性以及感知公平性.Installing elevators in old residential areas is currently an important issue in urbanization.One of the key problems is how to allocate the installation costs among owners with highly heterogeneous needs and benefits.This paper constructs an elevator game model based on cooperative game theory and shows that the elevator game is a convex game.Two generalized Bird s rules based on the minimum spanning tree game are proposed.The second type is similar to the existing cost-sharing mechanism and satisfy cost monotonicity,population monotonicity and perceived fairness.

关 键 词：电梯修建 合作博弈 凸博弈 最小支撑树博弈 电梯博弈 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]