贷款可获得性、信号发送与审计师选择——基于贷款利率上限取消的准自然实验  

Credit Availability,Signalling and Auditor Choice:Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Cancellation of the Upper Limits of Loan Interest Rates

作　　者：王红建 陈松 Wang Hongjian;Chen Song

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学金融学院,330013 [2]东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,116025

出　　处：《复印报刊资料（财务与会计导刊）（理论版）》2022年第10期97-113,共17页FINANCE & ACCOUNTING GUIDE

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71602069.71962020)。

摘　　要：融资需求是企业选择高质量审计师进行信号发送的重要动机。本文以我国贷款利率上限取消作为准自然实验,基于审计师需求信号理论研究贷款可获得性的提高如何影响企业审计师选择行为。研究发现:相对于低风险企业,贷款利率上限放开后高风险企业因贷款可获得性的提高而更倾向于选择高质量审计师进行信号发送,且融资约束程度越大的企业选择高质量审计师的动机越强,上述结果经过系列稳健性测试仍然成立。拓展性检验发现:高风险企业在贷款利率上限放开之后聘请高质量审计师确实获得更多长期贷款。本文基于我国贷款利率上限放开的准自然实验,识别了贷款可获得性与审计师选择之间的因果关系,同时也为高质量审计师在我国信贷市场的信号功能提供了经验证据。Financing demand is an important motivation for companies to choose high-quality auditors to send signals.This paper takes the cancellation of the upper limit of loan interest rate as a quasi-natural experiment,basing on the signal theory of auditor demand,to study how the improvement of credit availability affects the choice of the corporate's auditors.The empirical results show that,compared with low-risk enterprises,the liberalization of the loan interest rate ceiling led high-risk enterprises to choose high quality audit because of the increased loan availability,and this tendency is more pronounced in the corporates with higher financial constrain.The above results are still valid after a series of robustness tests.And extensive testing shows that high-risk companies choosing high-quality auditors do obtain more long-term loans after the loan interest rate ceiling was lifted.Based on the quasinatural experiment of liberalizing the upper limit of loan interest rate in China,this paper identifies the causal relationship between credit availability and auditor choice,and also provides empirical evidence for the signal function of high-quality auditors in China's credit market.

关 键 词：贷款可获得性 信号理论 声誉机制 高质量审计师 

分 类 号：F23[经济管理—会计学]