粮食价格、政策补贴对农民种粮积极性的影响——基于演化博弈模型  

The impact of grain price and policy subsidies on farmers’enthusiasm for growing grain:Based on the evolutionary game model

作　　者：刘欣晨 刘玉成[1] LIU Xin-chen;LIU Yu-cheng(School of Economics and Management,Yangtze University,Jingzhou 434023,Hubei,China)

机构地区：[1]长江大学经济与管理学院,湖北荆州434023

出　　处：《湖北农业科学》2024年第4期205-211,共7页Hubei Agricultural Sciences

摘　　要：构建农民、政府和第三方企业之间的演化博弈模型,从理论上分析了各方均衡决策下农民种粮积极性的演化稳定性,在此基础上利用个案数据进行仿真分析,仿真结果验证了理论分析结果。研究发现,农民的种粮积极性会随着粮食收购价格的波动而出现显著变化;单纯的种粮补贴无助于提升农民种粮积极性;同时过长时间的补贴可能会给农民、第三方企业带来更多不确定性因素。The evolutionary game model among farmers,government and third-party enterprises was constructed,and the evolution⁃ary stability of farmers’enthusiasm for growing grain in a balanced decision by all parties was theoretically analyzed.On this basis,the case data was used for simulation analysis,and the simulation results verified the theoretical analysis results.The study found that farmers’enthusiasm for growing grain would change significantly with the fluctuation of grain purchase price;grain subsidy alone did not help farmers to increase their enthusiasm for growing grain;and prolonged subsidies might bring more uncertainty to farmers and third-party enterprises.

关 键 词：农民种粮积极性 粮价波动 政策补贴 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F323.7[经济管理—产业经济]