Local government centralization and corporate ESG performance:Evidence from China’s county-to-district reform  

作　　者：Qihang Xue Huimin Wang Xiaole Ji Jian Wei 

机构地区：[1]School of Economics,Shandong University,Ji’nan,Shandong 250100,PR China [2]Zhongtai Securities Institute for Financial Studies,Shandong University,Ji’nan,Shandong 250100,PR China [3]Journal of Shandong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)Editorial Office,Ji’nan,Shandong 250100,PR China [4]Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences,Shandong University,Ji’nan,Shandong 250100,PR China

出　　处：《China Journal of Accounting Research》2023年第3期148-166,共19页中国会计学刊（英文版）

基　　金：supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.T2293773 and No.T2293770).

摘　　要：As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics,China’s countyto-district(CtD)reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city,thereby strengthening the administrative,decision-making,fiscal and other powers of the prefecture-level municipal government,which effectively enables the centralization of local governments.Based on this exogenous quasi-natural experiment,we use a difference-in-differences(DID)approach to empirically examine the impact of prefecture-level municipal government centralization on companies’ESG performance.The results show that municipal government centralization can significantly promote corporate ESG performance,which represents environmental protection,social responsibility and corporate governance behavior.The mechanism analysis also shows that the CtD reform can address market segmentation,alleviate policy uncertainty and reduce rentseeking,which further improves ESG performance.

关 键 词：Municipal government CENTRALIZATION County-to-district reform ESG Market segmentation Policy uncertainty RENT-SEEKING 

分 类 号：D63[政治法律—政治学] F27[政治法律—中外政治制度]