混合所有制改革视阈下考虑努力互补的融资机制研究  

The Financing Contract Design of Social Capital Investment in State-owned Enterprises Based on Complementary Efforts LIU Zhong-hua

作　　者：刘中华 汤颖哲 TANG Ying-zhe(School of Accounting,Guangdong University of Foreign Studies and Business,Guangzhou Guangdong 510006)

机构地区：[1]广东外语外贸大学会计学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《湖南财政经济学院学报》2024年第2期50-60,共11页Journal of Hunan University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“中国加入CPTPP的会计制度障碍及其化解策略研究”(项目编号:22BJY053)。

摘　　要：基于混合所有制改革背景下国有企业引入民营资本可能出现事前和事后道德风险的情形,考虑努力互补因素构建了股权融资和含控制权安排的可转换债券融资契约模型,论证了各契约方存在努力互补时可转换债券融资相对于普通股权融资更有利于激励各契约方的努力水平,各契约方的期望收益更高,是一个严格的帕累托改进;采用可转换债券融资时,投资者行权前后存在不同的控制权安排比始终保持由同一契约方绝对控制更有利于解决双边道德风险问题。Based on the fact that introducing social capital into state-owned enterprises may lead to bilateral moral hazard in China,we construct equity financing model and convertible bond financing model which complementary efforts and control rights are considered.Through strictly derivation,we find that efforts to complement each other are more conducive to resolving bilateral moral hazard problem than efforts to separate each contractual body in the mixed ownership reforming.Convertible bond financing is more conducive to motivating the efforts of each contractual body than common equity financing,and the expected returns of each contractual body is higher,which is a strict Pareto improvement of the former.At the same time,compared with maintaining absolute control by the same investor,the existence of different controllers before and after convertible bond conversion is more conducive to solving the bilateral moral hazard problem in the financing.

关 键 词：努力互补 双边道德风险 股权融资 可转换债券融资 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]