平行行为的反垄断规制  

The Regulation of Parrallel Conduct under Anti-Monopoly Law

作　　者：张江莉[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京师范大学法学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2024年第2期18-30,共13页Competition Policy Research

基　　金：司法部“数据竞争与算法竞争的反垄断规制”课题(项目编号:18SFB2045)的阶段性研究成果。

摘　　要：长期以来,传统寡头市场中大企业协调一致的平行行为的反垄断规制一直困难重重,也由此产生了一系列相互交错的制度工具。这些制度工具包含多种相互关联的基本概念,也反映了反垄断规制对于平行行为的复杂的理论立场。随着算法时代的来临,反垄断法将面对数量更多、更为稳固的平行行为。必须进一步将缺乏合意证据的“协议”、滥用共同支配地位行为、算法合谋等视为一个同源的整体——平行行为,并明确反垄断法相应的制度工具及其发展变化,才能更好地实现对平行行为的规制。For a long time,antitrust regulation of coordinated parallel conduct by large enterprises in traditional oligopolistic markets has been fraught with difficulties,leading to the development of a series of interlocking institutional tools.These tools encompass a variety of interconnected basic concepts and reflect the complex theoretical stance of antitrust regulation towards parallel conduct.With the advent of the algorithmic era,antitrust laws will face a greater number and more stable instances of parallel conduct.It is essential to further view"agreements"lacking evidence of consensus,abuses of a collective dominant position,and algorithmic collusion as a unified whole—parallel conduct—and to clarify the corresponding institutional tools of antitrust law and their evolution in order to better regulate parallel conduct.

关 键 词：平行行为 协同行为 共同支配地位 反垄断 算法合谋 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]