考虑公平偏好的工程总承包联合体协同优化收益分配机制研究  

Research on Optimal Cooperative Profit Allocation Mechanism of General Contracting Consortium Considering Fairness Preference

作　　者：丁继勇[1] 刘新宇 安晓伟 DING Jiyong;LIU Xinyu;AN Xiaowei(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211100,China;School of Water Conservancy,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou 450045,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]华北水利水电大学水利学院,河南郑州450045

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2024年第2期36-41,共6页Journal of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19FJYB004);安徽省自然科学基金“水科学”联合基金项目(2208085US19)。

摘　　要：考虑参与方谈判能力的差异性,研究设计施工联合体优化收益分配问题,构建无公平偏好情形和具有公平偏好情形下的Nash谈判模型,得到最优收益分配方案和双方最优努力水平,分析谈判能力和公平偏好对双方决策和利润的影响。结果表明:谈判能力与施工方努力水平呈现倒“U”型趋势;而与设计方努力水平的关系受到公平偏好的调节,呈现倒“U”型和正相关两种趋势。公平偏好与设计方努力水平之间呈现负相关、倒“U”型和正相关3种趋势;当设计方谈判能力较强时,施工方适度的公平偏好可激励设计方提高努力水平;当设计方谈判能力较弱时,施工方的公平偏好会降低设计方的努力水平。以期为工程总承包联合体优化收益分配机制构建提供参考,助力工程总承包联合体共创共赢。Considering the differences in bargaining power between two participants,the optimal profit allocation problem of the design and construction consortium is studied.Specifically,we construct two Nash bargaining models,in which one acts as a benchmark and the other introduces fairness preference,to determine the optimal profit allocation and effort levels of both sides and conduct the impact of fairness preference on decision and profits.The results show that:the relationship between the bargaining power and the construction unit's effort level presents an inverted"U"shaped trend,while bargaining power has a mixed impact on the design unit's effort level,which is modulated by fairness preferences and follows an inverted"U"shape or a positive correlation pattern;when the Fairness preferences also have a negative correlation,inverted"U"shape,and positive correlation effect on the effort level of the design unit;when the bargaining power of the design unit is relatively strong,an appropriate fairness preference of the construction unit can act as an incentive to increase its effort level.However,when the bargaining power of the design unit is relatively weak,the fairness preference of the construction unit may reduce its effort level.The research aims to provide reference for optimal profit allocation mechanisms in general contracting consortium to promote common creation and mutual benefits.

关 键 词：工程总承包 联合体 谈判模型 谈判能力 公平偏好 

分 类 号：F283[经济管理—国民经济]