中国式影子银行的收缩与企业投资行为——基于资管新规出台背景的证据  

The Contraction of Chinese Shadow Banking and Corporate Investment Behavior——Evidence from the Background of the"New Rules on Asset Management"

作　　者：冀志斌[1] 叶耐德 孔东民[3] JI Zhibin;YE Naide;Kong Dongmin(Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;Shanghai Jiao Tong University;Huazhong University of Science and Technology)

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学金融学院 [2]上海交通大学上海高级金融学院 [3]华中科技大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2024年第2期661-676,共16页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：中南财经政法大学基本科研业务费青年教师创新项目“资产价格、金融稳定与中国经济发展”(2722019JCT012)的资助。

摘　　要：利用2018年4月资管新规出台这一外生场景,本文探讨了中国式影子银行的收缩对企业投资行为造成的影响。我们发现资管新规的出台使得此前依赖影子银行体系进行融资的企业(相较于其他企业)的投资水平下降了18.3%。进一步的分析显示,资管新规的出台加剧了企业的融资约束并且减短了企业的债务期限。最后,本文发现资管新规的出台对企业投资的抑制作用主要体现在边际资本产出较低的企业,而对边际资本产出较高的企业而言,这种抑制作用有限,因此资管新规的出台提升了资本在企业间的配置效率。Employing the exogenous scenario introduced by the“New Rules on Asset Management”in April 2018,we try to explore the impact of the contraction of Chinese-style shadow banking on corporate investment behavior.We find that the regulation leads to a 18.3%decrease in capital expenditure for firms relying on shadow banking system prior to the shock.Then,we test three underlying mechanisms,which include the decrease of corporate borrowing,the increase of corporate financing constraints and the reduction of debt maturity.We also provide the empirical evidence that the implementation of the“New Rules on Asset Management”optimizes the allocation of capital across firms.

关 键 词：资管新规 影子银行 企业投资 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275