双重制度视角下政府补贴对企业研发投入影响悖论的新解与验证  

A new explanation and verification of the paradox of government subsidies influence on enterprise R&D investment from the perspective of dual-institutional elements

作　　者：林春培[1,2] 朱晓艳 曾志盛 余传鹏[3] LIN Chunpei;ZHU Xiaoyan;ZENG Zhisheng;YU Chuanpeng(Business School,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China;Center for Business Management Research,Huaqiao University,Quanzhou 362021,China;Department of Tourism Management,South China University of Technology,Guangzhou 510006,China)

机构地区：[1]华侨大学工商管理学院,福建泉州362021 [2]华侨大学商务管理研究中心,福建泉州362021 [3]华南理工大学旅游管理系,广东广州510006

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第3期108-121,共14页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71974059);华侨大学中央高校基本科研业务费项目(22SKGC-QT03);国家社会科学基金项目(18ZDA062)。

摘　　要：本文利用中国A股上市公司2008—2020年的样本数据实证考察了政府补贴对企业研发投入的影响,并基于双重视角,即企业外部非正式制度层面的政治关联和内部正式制度层面的股权激励,探讨其对政府补贴与企业研发投入之间关系的调节作用。研究结果表明:(1)适度的政府补贴有助于促进企业研发投入,即政府补贴对研发投入会产生倒U型影响;(2)政治关联会负向调节政府补贴与研发投入之间的倒U型关系;(3)股权激励与政府补贴之间具有互补作用,不仅能抵消过度补贴可能带来的抑制效应,还能进一步增强补贴初期对企业研发投入的激励效应,将两者的倒U型关系转变为正向线性关系。此外,内生性问题分析结果表明上述结论具有稳健性。该研究结论有助于我国政府合理制定补贴政策,为企业科学使用政府补贴以促进研发活动提供有益启示。The relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment has long been debated.One view holds that government subsidies have an incentive effect,reducing the concerns and risks of enterprise technical knowledge spillover,improving R&D enthusiasm,and promoting enterprises to increase R&D investment.Another perspective is that government subsidies have an inhibitory effect,inducing enterprises to carry out rent-seeking activities and transfer the funds planned for R&D activities elsewhere,thereby reducing enterprise R&D investment.The main reason for the inconsistent views is that no research has comprehensively superpositioned the incentive and inhibition effects of government subsidies,and considered the institutional integration of government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.Formal systems,such as legal provisions and enterprise systems,and informal systems,such as interpersonal relations and traditional customs,are the key variables affecting the implementation efficiency of government subsidies.Scholars have not yet explored this topic.Thus,this paper introduces the institutional theory and attempts to build a conceptual relationship model containing dual institutional elements to analyze the impact of government subsidies on enterprise R&D investment.Based on signal theory and rent-seeking theory,this paper deeply analyzes the relationship between government subsidies and enterprise R&D investment.It introduces the institutional theory to explore the political connection at the external informal institutional level and the regulatory effect of equity incentives at the internal formal institutional level.Taking China A-share listed companies between 2008 and 2020 as the research object,the general OLS regression model is used to test the research hypothesis.The results show that:1)moderate government subsidies can promote R&D investment,that is,there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government subsidies and R&D investment;2)Political connection negatively moderates the inv

关 键 词：政府补贴 正式制度 非正式制度 研发投入 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]