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作 者:崔小勇[1] 赵煦风 闫昱 Cui Xiaoyong;Zhao Xufeng;Yan Yu
机构地区:[1]北京大学经济学院,北京100871
出 处:《复印报刊资料(财政与税务)》2023年第7期31-46,共16页
基 金:国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA069,21&ZD097)资助。
摘 要:本文为研究政府间转移支付提供了一个可拓展的一般性理论框架。在公共支出存在外部性、地区对于公共品需求具有异质性偏好的设定下,本文证明中央对地方一般性转移支付是公共支出的函数,其边际量大小由四个因素决定,分别是支出对转移支付的弹性、公共支出在地区间的分布、中央对公共支出均等化的偏好,以及地区公共支出的外部性大小。结合该理论框架,本文进一步使用中国2019年的县级财政数据进行了数值分析,结果表明最优边际转移支付呈现U型且主要为负,其形状主要由公共支出均等化偏好和外部性决定。通过与现实政策对比,本文认为应进一步增强地区间基本公共服务均等化的政策倾斜力度。Transfer payments play important roles in national financial systems with multi-level governments.Gen-eral transfer payments,as the most important part of China's transfer payments,are crucial to the financial operation of local governments in China.The main functions of general transfer payments are to narrow regional financial gaps and guarantee basic local public service.In the past 30 years,China's general transfer payment system has been continu-ously modernized,but there are still many problems needing to be solved.China's transfer payment system has efficien-cy problems.First,there is a flypaper effect of transfer payments.Second,due to the information asymmetry between the central government and local governments,local governments have the incentive to disguise their expenditure levels,re-sulting in a mismatch between transfer payments and public expenditures.Third,transfer payment policies do not con-sider inter-regional externalities of public expenditures.Besides,transfer payments are still deficient in terms of the effect of inter-regional equalization,and there are still huge regional gaps in the levels of transfer payments and public expenditures.The current general transfer payment system is mainly based on formulas,which cannot fully solve the above-mentioned problems of transfer payments,and this system pays little attention to factors such as externalities.In order to optimize the general transfer payment policy,this paper discusses the above factors in a unified framework by constructing a theoretical model to study the optimization of the general transfer payment policy.In this model,there is heterogeneity in local governments'preferences for public expenditures,which cannot be observed by the central government and can only be captured by local governments.Local public expenditures have nationwide externalities.By designing a principal-agent mechanism,this paper demonstrates that the central government can define transfer payments based on levels of public spending when local revenues are not
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