快递进村倡议下“邮快合作”主体博弈关系研究  

Research on the Game Relationship of "Cooperation Between Postal Express and Private Express" Subjects Under the Initiative of Express Delivery into Villages

作　　者：黄建华[1] 廖梦 HUANG Jianhua;LIAO Meng(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China;不详)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济管理学院,福建福州350108 [2]福州大学先进制造学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2024年第2期253-259,268,共8页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金一般项目(20BGL003)。

摘　　要：快递进村具有成本高和效率低的困难,邮政与民营快递企业在共建配送中心、开展共同配送业务等方面进行合作,是解决这一问题的重要手段。因此围绕共建共配的邮快合作模式,分析了邮政快递企业和民营快递企业之间的合作和博弈关系,并构建了演化博弈模型,选取某区的实际数据作为算例,探讨不同因素对合作稳定性的影响以及政府政策在邮快合作中所起的作用效果。结果表明:邮政占据主导地位对推进快递进村具有一定优势,政府推进邮快合作的政策补贴应考虑多种补贴形式。Express delivery into villages faces high costs and low efficiency,and cooperation between postal and private express delivery enterprises in jointly building distribution centers and conducting joint delivery services is an important means to solve this problem.Therefore,around the cooperation between postal express and private express model of co-construction and co-distribution,the cooperation and game relationship between postal express enterprises and private express enterprises was analyzed,and an evolutionary game model based on this model was built.Taking the actual data of a district as an example,the impact of different factors on the stability of cooperation and the effect of government policies in the cooperation between postal express and private express were discussed.The results indicated that the dominant position of postal services has certain advantages in promoting the policy of express delivery into villages,and the government′s policy subsidies for promoting cooperation between postal express and private express should consider various forms of subsidies.

关 键 词：快递进村 邮快合作 政府管理 共建共配 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F252.1[经济管理—国民经济] F325.1