可持续公共采购中寻租监管的动态演化稳定性控制  

Dynamic Evolutionary Stability Control of Rent-seeking andSupervision in Sustainable Public Procurement

作　　者：周雄勇 许志端[3] 郗永勤 ZHOU Xiongyong;XU Zhiduan;XI Yongqin(School of Economics and Management,Fuzhou University,Fuzhou 350108,China;Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China;School of Management,Xiamen University,Xiamen 361005,China)

机构地区：[1]福州大学经济与管理学院,福建福州350108 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030 [3]厦门大学管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2024年第3期155-161,共7页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71872155);福建省社会科学研究基地重大项目(FJ2023JD020)。

摘　　要：可持续公共采购的腐败风险在近年来受到学术界的高度关注,本文旨在借助演化博弈和系统动力学探究可持续公共采购中三方主体(政府监管部门、采购人员和供应商)寻租与监管的动态演化博弈过程,并引入动态奖励-惩罚机制对模型进行改进,以寻求稳定控制的最优演化策略。研究结果表明:(1)政府监管成本、采购人员心理期望、寻租收益空间以及奖惩额度是影响三方演化博弈的关键因素。降低监管成本,提高采购人员心理预期,扩大招标范围有助于降低寻租风险。(2)通过引入奖励-惩罚机制对模型进行稳定性控制,在同时考虑寻租概率和腐败程度的动态机制下,“政府不监管、采购人员不寻租和供应商提供可持续产品”的策略组合是最终得到的演化稳定策略,这一结论与初始模型推导的结果相印证。以该策略为基础,进而对可持续公共采购部门的采购决策、程序和监管机制的优化提出政策建议。Sustainable public procurement(SPP)refers to the requirement for government procurement activities to achieve the fundamental economic function of“value for money”while fully leveraging the sustainable policy function of guiding environmental protection and fulfilling social responsibilities.With the increasing scale of SPP,covert operations in the supply of sustainable products become more frequent.Issues such as the inadequacy of sustainable labeling systems,the absence of product standards,and the falsification of product certificates become more pronounced.The problem with“sustainable corruption”wherein procurement personnel and suppliers collude,shield each other,and conspire for rent-seeking,continues to hinder the rational operation of the public sector procurement chain.Existing research has explored the causes,harms,and necessity of regulatory measures in rent-seeking corruption within SPP.However,there is a scarcity of research at the mathematical level examining the mechanisms of rent-seeking and regulation,with a notable gap in the study of decision-making behavior in SPP.In light of this,this paper aims to analyze the dynamic evolution mechanisms of rent-seeking and regulatory behavior among regulatory authorities,procurement personnel,and suppliers in SPP.By constructing an asymmetric tripartite dynamic evolutionary game model,the paper discusses the evolutionary strategies and conditions of rent-seeking and regulation generated by various stakeholders in the purchase of sustainable products.The stability of equilibrium points is verified using a system dynamics model.To obtain the optimal solution for the model and optimize its stability,a dynamic reward-penalty mechanism is introduced to enhance the model,ultimately yielding the optimal evolutionary stable strategy.The research results indicate that,on the one hand,government regulatory costs,procurement personnel psychological expectations,rent-seeking profit space,and reward-penalty thresholds are critical factors influencing the evoluti

关 键 词：可持续公共采购 寻租监管 演化博弈 奖励-惩罚机制 

分 类 号：F812.45[经济管理—财政学] F224.32